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Harnessing Investor Interest in Sustainability: The 
Next Frontier in Environmental Information 
Regulation 
Daniel C. Esty† & Quentin Karpilow‡ 
This Article rethinks the theory and application of environmental 
information regulation in light of growing investor interest in sustainability. 
Academics and policymakers have long viewed mandatory information 
disclosure as a powerful regulatory tool for improving corporate environmental 
performance, with some going so far as to call environmental information 
regulation the third phase of American environmental law. Current thinking on 
environmental information regulation has failed, however, to keep pace with 
recent transformations in the investment community. Over the past decade, 
sustainable investing has rapidly moved from the fringes of the investment world 
to the mainstream as an increasing number of investors seek to align their values 
with the holdings of their portfolios. We argue that environmental information 
regulation, in the form of a mandatory corporate environmental, social, and 
governance (ESG) disclosure regime, could significantly facilitate this broader 
realignment of capital markets with sustainability principles. As we explain, 
standard models of environmental information regulation are ill-equipped to 
address the information needs of today’s investment community. Instead, this 
Article calls for a new design of environmental information regulation capable 
of harnessing mainstream investor interest in sustainability—and, in doing so, 
creating a new vector of leverage in support of a sustainable future for our 
society. 
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Introduction 
Regulators and legal scholars have long recognized the potential of 
information regulation to further environmental policy goals.1 The elegance of 
such a regulatory strategy lies in its harnessing of private actors to incentivize 
improved corporate environmental performance.2 According to the established 
theory, environmental information regulation deploys mandatory disclosure 
requirements to generate new, publicly accessible data that allow investors, 
consumers, and civic society to compare and rank companies across an array of 
environmental measures or “metrics.”3 In response, markets punish 
 
 1.   David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: 
A Law & Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 381-82 (2005) (“[I]nformational regulation 
emerged . . . as a potential success story in the pursuit of alternatives to command-and-control 
environmental regulation.”); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and 
Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 260 (2001) (describing 
“the systematic use of performance monitoring and benchmarking as regulatory tools” as a “watershed” 
moment for environmental regulation); Paul R. Kleindorfer & Eric W. Orts, Informational Regulation of 
Environmental Risks, 18 RISK ANALYSIS 155, 156 (1998) (noting that “[a] shift toward increasing reliance 
on informational regulation . . . has begun in the environmental arena”); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational 
Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 619 (1999) 
(commenting on the potential of environmental information regulation to alter corporate behavior). 
Indeed, some have gone so far as to call information regulation “phase three” of American environmental 
law. See Tom Tietenberg & David Wheeler, Empowering the Community: Information Strategies for 
Pollution Control, in FRONTIERS OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 85, 86 (Henk Folmer et al. eds., 2001). 
 2.   See infra Section I.A. Environmental information regulation may also apply to public 
entities. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), for example, requires federal agencies to 
produce environmental impact statements for major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of 
the human environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2018); see also Sarah E. Light, NEPA’s Footprint: Information 
Disclosure as a Quasi-Carbon Tax on Agencies, 87 TUL. L. REV. 511, 511 (2013) (classifying NEPA as 
a form of information regulation); Lauren Giles Wishnie, NEPA for a New Century: Climate Change and 
the Reform of the National Environmental Policy Act, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 628, 631 (2008) (describing 
how NEPA functions as information regulation). In addition, information regulation can come in the form 
of sustainable labeling requirements for consumer goods. See Daniel C. Esty, Next Generation 
Environmental Law: A Response to Richard Stewart, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 183, 195 (2001) (discussing the 
potential of “eco-labels [to] now steer green-conscious consumers to environmentally superior products”). 
This Article, however, focuses on environmental information regulation as applied to private firms. Due 
to the investor community’s recent and dramatic growth in interest in sustainable investing, the time is 
particularly ripe to rethink the design of environmental disclosure requirements for companies. See infra 
Section II.B. 
 3.   In this Article, a “metric” refers to a measurement or indicator that tracks a 
company’s performance on an issue of interest. See Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the 
Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 166 (2004) (explaining how comparative environmental metrics 
can guide environmental action in the corporate context); Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 261 (discussing 
how performance monitoring and benchmarking encourage firms to “compare, rank, and track [their 
environmental] performance among production processes, facilities, operating units, and peer or 
competitor firms”). 
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environmental laggards, viewing poor environmental performance as a financial 
liability.4 The same data also allow firms to learn from their peers and to identify 
and remedy previously unknown inefficiencies in their supply chains, production 
processes, and management strategies.5 In this way, environmental information 
regulation creates both internal and external incentives for firms to improve their 
environmental management practices—all with minimal direct involvement by 
government regulators.6 
Current theories and applications of environmental information regulation, 
however, fail to tap the full potential of this regulatory strategy to advance 
environmental objectives. To date, policymakers and academics have viewed 
information regulation solely as a tool for driving markets away from 
environmental laggards.7 But few have grasped the important role that 
 
 4.   See Archon Fung & Dara O’Rourke, Reinventing Environmental Regulation from the 
Grassroots Up: Explaining and Expanding the Success of the Toxics Release Inventory, 25 ENVTL. MGMT. 
115, 120-23 (2000) (explaining how the Toxic Release Information program—one of the most prominent 
examples of environmental information regulation—induces emissions reductions by “blacklisting” the 
worst-performing firms); James T. Hamilton, Pollution as News: Media and Stock Market Reactions to 
the Toxics Release Inventory Data, 28 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 98, 112 (1995) (finding empirical 
evidence that toxic-waste disclosures reduce the stock market prices of high-polluting firms); Shameek 
Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information as Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to Know Laws on 
Toxic Emissions, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109, 110 (1997) (explaining how public disclosure of 
“bad information leads markets to punish firms that are bad actors” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Marc Orlitzky, Corporate Social Performance and Financial Performance: A Research Synthesis, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 5-6 (Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008) 
(discussing how negative environmental publicity can damage corporate reputation and brand name). 
 5.   See Daniel C. Esty, Measurement Matters: Toward Data-Driven Environmental 
Policymaking, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK ON SUSTAINABILITY INDICATORS (Simon Bell & Steve Morse 
eds., forthcoming 2018); see also Daniel C. Esty & Reece Rushing, Governing by the Numbers: The 
Promise of Data-Driven Policymaking in the Information Age, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 2 (2006), 
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2007/04/pdf/data_driven_policy_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A7FX-VA7Y] (explaining how comparative benchmarking can lead to peer-to-peer 
learning); Konar & Cohen, supra note 4, at 112 (discussing how internal monitoring of pollution can 
improve firm efficiency). 
 6.   David W. Case, The Law and Economics of Environmental Information as 
Regulation, 31 ENVTL. L. REV. 10,773, 10,773 (2001) (“[I]nformation disclosure has emerged as a key 
component of strategies to promote more effective, less costly alternatives to command-and-control 
regulation.”); Madhu Khanna et al., Toxics Release Information: A Policy Tool for Environmental 
Protection, 36 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 243, 245 (1998) (framing environmental information regulation 
as “an innovative effort to reduce the role of big government bureaucracy and engage private sector 
participation in regulating the environment”); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental 
Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 131 (2001) (explaining how information regulation and other 
innovative policies have begun to shift environmental regulation away from government-centered 
regulation and toward “self-regulation”). 
 7.   See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen, Information as a Policy Instrument in Protecting the 
Environment: What Have We Learned?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10425, 10425-27 (Apr. 2001) (focusing on 
how information disclosures that spotlight environmental laggards can induce better environmental 
performance); Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 295 (focusing primarily on how information regulation can 
“exert powerful pressures on poor performers to up-grade their [environmental] performance”); Konar & 
Cohen, supra note 4, at 111 (explaining how information disclosure requirements under EPA’s Toxic 
Release inventory can induce better corporate environmental performance by harnessing consumers, 
investors, and the public to penalize the worst performers in an industry); Stewart, supra note 6, at 139 
(suggesting that mandatory disclosure programs are most appropriate for negative environmental 
information); Adam Sulkowski & Steven White, Financial Performance, Pollution Measures, and the 
Propensity to Use Corporate Responsibility Reporting: Implications for Business and Legal Scholarship, 
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information regulation can play in guiding markets toward environmental 
leaders.8 Thus, in both theory and practice, mandatory disclosure regimes have 
worked to spotlight bad environmental performance and thereby create a series 
of informational red lights that warn consumers and investors about the worst 
actors in an industry. They do not, however, provide a companion set of 
informational green lights capable of identifying and rewarding the best actors 
in an industry.9 
While this red-lights model of environmental information regulation may 
have sufficed in the past, it has become outdated due to the growing investor-
community interest in sustainability—a concept that broadly encompasses a host 
of interconnected environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues.10 Until 
recently, sustainable investing has operated on the fringes of the investment 
world, appropriate only for a few “socially responsible” investors who exclude 
bad actors from their portfolios, often with little or no regard for the impact on 
their investment returns.11 The past decade, however, has witnessed a 
groundswell of interest in sustainability among mainstream investors.12 These 
 
21 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 491, 503 (2010) (explaining how disclosure programs can lead to 
“bad actors being punished by investors and consumers for creating risks and liabilities”); Shameek Konar 
& Mark A. Cohen, Why Do Firms Pollute (and Reduce) Toxic Emissions? 11-16 (OECD Working Paper 
19971), https://www.oecd.org/env/outreach/33947723.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7HD-55GB] (focusing on 
how mandatory disclosure can use the threat of “negative publicity” to incentivize better environmental 
performance). 
 8.   See infra Section I.B. 
 9.   This Article builds on Professor Esty’s earlier calls to shift American environmental 
law away from a regulatory framework that “centers on telling people what they cannot do, to a broader 
structure of incentives and ‘green lights’ that would engage the public and the business world in 
environmental problem solving.” Daniel C. Esty, Red Lights to Green Lights: From 20th Century 
Environmental Regulation to 21st Century Sustainability, 47 ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2017). 
 10.   There is no definitive definition of sustainability. At its broadest level, sustainability 
can be understood as a set of environmental, economic, and social issues that must be addressed to “meet[] 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” 
WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 43-46 (1987). In the investor context, 
sustainability often has been operationalized as nonexhaustive lists of environmental, social, and 
governance issues that include some of the following characteristics: “issues that have traditionally been 
considered non-financial or non-material; a medium- or long-term time horizon; qualitative objectives 
that are readily quantifiable in monetary terms; externalities (costs borne by other firms or by society at 
large) not well captured by market mechanisms; a changing regulatory or policy framework; patterns 
arising throughout a company’s supply chain (and therefore susceptible to unknown risks); [and] a public-
concern focus.” Mercer Inv. Consulting, Glossary, in SUSTAINABLE INVESTING: THE ART OF LONG-TERM 
PERFORMANCE 214 (Cary Krosinsky & Nick Robins eds., 2008). 
 11.   See infra Section II.B. 
 12.   Timo Busch et al., Sustainable Development and Financial Markets: Old Paths and 
New Avenues, 55 BUS. & SOC’Y 303, 304 (2015) (reporting that “the market share of sustainable 
investments . . . has been growing in recent years . . . and is further expected to increase”) (internal 
quotations omitted); 2016 Trends Report Highlights, US SIF 1 (2016), 
https://www.ussif.org/files/Trends/US%20SIF%202016%20Trends%20Overview.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3ADS-4WAB] (showing remarkable growth in sustainable investments in the United 
States since 1995); Libby Bernick, ESG Moves from the Margins to the Mainstream, GREENBIZ (Jan. 22, 
2018, 1:45 AM), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/esg-moves-margins-mainstream 
[https://perma.cc/BW9K-2D4W] (documenting the growth of interest in sustainable investing); Gordon 
L. Clark et al., From the Stockholder to the Stakeholder: How Sustainability Can Drive Financial 
Outperformance, ARABESQUE PARTNERS 10 (Mar. 2015), 
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investors also want to integrate sustainability considerations into their portfolio 
design, but they differ from socially responsible investors in at least two 
important respects.13 First, they are interested not only in divesting from 
sustainability laggards but also in investing in sustainability leaders. Second, 
they care about maintaining robust portfolio returns. They therefore eschew the 
crude “negative exclusion” strategies of past socially responsible investors and 
instead seek to bring a sustainability tilt to their portfolios that is finely calibrated 
to their own desired levels of sustainability and financial returns.14 
This Article calls for a new model of information regulation to harness the 
growing interest in sustainability among mainstream investors. While scholars 
have tended to focus on environmental information regulation, the policy logic 
and potential of this regulatory strategy applies with equal force to the broader 
sustainability concerns that are driving these trends in mainstream ESG 
investing. However, the traditional conception and design of environmental 
information regulation is ill-suited for the mainstream investing community. 
Specifically, the red-lights model—with its focus on sustainability laggards and 
its lack of focus on sustainability issues that are material to corporate financial 
performance—caters to the priorities and preferences of a relatively narrow set 
of socially responsible investors.15 By contrast, an expanding number of 
mainstream investors seek a set of corporate sustainability metrics that are tightly 
linked to business fundamentals and that will allow them to both mitigate the 
risk downsides of unsustainable management practices and exploit the growth 
and productivity upsides of sustainability leadership.16 While existing voluntary 
 
https://arabesque.com/research/From_the_stockholder_to_the_stakeholder_web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B87T-L7AG] (calling sustainability “one of the most significant trends in financial 
markets for decades”); Investment Review 2016, GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE INV. ALLIANCE (2016), 
http://www.gsi-alliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/GSIR_Review2016.F.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/577B-3XMK] (discussing recent trends in global sustainable investing); Doug Morrow 
& Michael Yow, Measuring Sustainability Disclosure: Ranking the World’s Stock Exchanges, CORP. 
KNIGHTS CAP. 5 (2016), http://www.sseinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/SSE2016Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LL5W-HWZ2] (discussing “investors’ growing interest in building sustainable 
investment strategies”); Sustainable Investment Joins the Mainstream, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 25, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/11/25/sustainable-investment-joins-the-
mainstream [https://perma.cc/QT7U-SJQV] (same). 
 13.   See infra Section II.B. 
 14.   See Daniel C. Esty & Todd Cort, Corporate Sustainability Metrics: What Investors 
Need and Don’t Get, 8 J. ENVTL. INVESTING 13, 23 (2017) (creating a typology of today’s sustainability-
minded investors); Elizabeth Lewis et al., Navigating the Sustainable Investment Landscape, WORLD 
RESOURCES INST. 21 (2016), 
https://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/Navigating_the_Sustainable_Investment_Landscape.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SZB8-KA9M] (describing a range of strategies used by investors to integrate 
sustainability considerations into their portfolios); Gregory Stewart et al., Trends in Environmental, 
Social, and Governance Investing, BNY MELLON 11-12 (2012), 
http://www.greeneaglefinancial.com/files/67976/BNYmellon.pdf [https://perma.cc/H94G-SLVR] 
(same). 
 15.   See infra Section II.C. 
 16.   See David A. Lubin & Daniel C. Esty, The Sustainability Imperative, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (May 2010), https://hbr.org/2010/05/the-sustainability-imperative [https://perma.cc/WY3V-UH5E] 
(discussing how sustainability trends will fundamentally reshape the business landscape). See generally 
DANIEL C. ESTY & ANDREW S. WINSTON, GREEN TO GOLD (2009) (documenting a spectrum of “green-
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sustainability disclosure frameworks have taken key steps toward satisfying 
these informational demands, this Article argues that they are not sufficient—
nor will they become sufficient—due to the public goods nature of sustainability 
information.17 Instead, today’s informational barriers to sustainable investing are 
best addressed through a mandatory disclosure regime that provides investors 
with a menu of material sustainability metrics capable of distinguishing 
sustainability leaders from laggards.18 
In this way, the Article seeks to adapt and update the theory and insights of 
environmental information regulation to the needs and realities of today’s 
investing community. As such, the Article is primarily concerned with the 
environmental dimensions of sustainability. Nevertheless, it is important to note 
that mainstream investor interest in sustainability extends beyond environmental 
concerns to encompass the social and governance aspects of sustainability. Thus, 
while some of these investors care about the environmental issues that have 
traditionally been the focus of environmental law scholars, such as greenhouse 
gas emissions, energy consumption, water pollution, toxic waste, and 
biodiversity, others have broader interests. Some focus on corporate governance 
issues—e.g., board composition, corporate transparency, executive 
compensation, and human resources management. And others want to track 
corporate performance on an even broader array of social issues—e.g., consumer 
protection, poverty, health care, human rights, and workplace diversity. 
Harnessing investor interest in sustainability therefore requires a disclosure 
framework that accounts for the entire spectrum of environmental, social, and 
governance issues that underpin the concept of sustainability. Accordingly, this 
Article advocates for a shift from environmental information regulation to a 
broader form of sustainability information regulation. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the current thinking on 
environmental information regulation—highlighting, in particular, the 
dominance of the red-lights model. Part II then describes the investment world’s 
recent shift toward sustainability. It argues that today’s sustainability disclosure 
regimes do not satisfy the informational needs of mainstream investors. As a 
result, investors’ interest in sustainability has outstripped their adoption of 
sustainable investing practices. To overcome informational barriers and better 
align capital markets with sustainability goals, Part III calls on academics and 
 
to-gold” opportunities wherein sustainability investments can translate into higher profits); Michael E. 
Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness 
Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 97 (1995) (discussing how better corporate environmental management 
can improve corporate financial performance). As discussed below in Section II.A infra, substantial 
empirical work supports the hypothesis that some forms of sustainability leadership can enhance firm 
productivity and revenue growth. See, e.g., Gunnar Friede et al., ESG and Financial Performance: 
Aggregated Evidence from More than 2000 Empirical Studies, 5 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 210, 210 
(2015) (reporting positive relationships between corporate environmental performance and corporate 
financial performance based on meta-analyses of more than two thousand empirical studies). 
 17.   See infra Sections II.C, III.A. 
 18.   See infra Section III.B. 
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regulators to move beyond the red-lights model of information regulation and to 
develop a combined red-lights/green-lights model tailored to the needs and 
priorities of mainstream investors. To begin, it argues for a mandatory disclosure 
framework to overcome the under-reporting and methodological problems that 
plague the many voluntary sustainability disclosure standards developed by 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and commercial ESG data providers. It 
then outlines several core principles for designing the optimal sustainability 
information regulation for mainstream investors before arguing that the benefits 
of this regulation outweigh its costs. Part IV concludes with a call for policy 
action to develop the sustainability disclosure framework outlined in the prior 
sections. 
I. Current Thinking on Environmental Information Regulation 
This Part reviews the standard model of environmental information 
regulation. Section I.A explains how mandatory disclosure requirements 
incentivize companies to improve environmental practices and outcomes. 
Section I.B then argues that academics and regulators have largely understood 
environmental information regulation as a tool for driving markets away from 
environmental laggards but not necessarily toward environmental leaders. 
A. How It Works 
Economists and legal scholars have identified several ways in which 
mandatory disclosure of environmental data can induce better corporate 
environmental performance. First, the data may reveal production inefficiencies 
that were previously unknown to corporate management.19 Such insights may 
stem from the firm’s analysis of its own data.20 Or they may come when a firm 
uses the data to compare its environmental performance to those of its 
competitors.21 If, for example, a company produces far more toxic waste than its 
 
 19.   Cohen, supra note 7, at 10427 (discussing how corporate environmental managers 
use “this information . . . in setting priorities and looking for areas where a company might be able to 
improve its environmental performance”); Esty, supra note 3, at 166 (“In the corporate context, 
environmental metrics allow executives to evaluate their pollution control and resource management 
practices with rigor. Facility-specific data can be used to identify top-tier performance, establish targets 
for progress, and provide a foundation for programs to move a corporation’s operations toward leading-
edge standards.”); Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 297; see also Daniel C. Esty & Michael E. Porter, 
Industrial Ecology and Competitiveness, 2 J. IND. ECOL. 36-39 (1998) (explaining how firms can improve 
productivity by identifying and eliminating previously unknown waste streams). 
 20.   Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You 
Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1342 (1996) (observing that companies “manage 
what [they] measure” and arguing that mandatory disclosure can have the “effect of forcing managers to 
confront disagreeable realities”). 
 21.   ESTY & RUSHING, supra note 5, at 34 (discussing how “comparative analysis that 
measures the relative performance of peers . . . promotes collective learning by spotlighting the most 
effective strategies that should be expanded, as well as ineffective strategies that should be avoided”); 
Esty, supra note 5 (examining how comparative benchmarking across firms can improve environmental 
performance outcomes). 
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peers, this gap may point to opportunities for the firm to improve its resource 
use, cut regulatory costs, and thereby enhance its operational efficiency.22 
In addition to these internal pressures to improve environmental 
performance, information regulations can create external pressures from 
interested stakeholders.23 Investors, for example, may view a low ranking on an 
environmental metric as a financial risk—either because it signals that the firm’s 
underlying operations are inefficient and wasteful or because it foreshadows 
potential legal risks in the form of future tort suits or increased scrutiny from 
regulators.24 As such, mandatory disclosure of new environmental data may 
drive profit-focused investors away from firms that are shown to be particularly 
harmful to the environment.25 Even if the link between sustainability 
performance and financial results is not entirely clear, a growing number of 
mainstream investors want greater alignment between their portfolio holdings 
and their values. 
Information disclosure can alter corporate behavior through consumer and 
employee channels as well.26 Revelations that a firm has engaged in 
environmentally harmful activities can damage its reputation and brand name.27 
As a result, the company risks not only losing customers (particularly those 
willing to pay a premium for eco-friendly products) but also triggering NGO 
denunciations or even consumer boycotts.28 Reputational damage may also 
 
 22.   ESTY & RUSHING, supra note 5, at 34 (discussing how benchmarking can lead to 
peer-to-peer learning); Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 297 (describing how many corporate managers were 
“unaware of the volumes of toxic pollutants their firms were generating” and were “surprised by the 
information produced in the first rounds of [the Toxics Release Inventory]”); Konar & Cohen, supra note 
4, at 112 (noting that pollution can serve “as a signal of the firm’s productive efficiency”). 
 23.   Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 261 (describing the internal and external pressures to 
improve corporate environmental performance); Konar & Cohen, supra note 4, at 110 (“If consumers, 
community groups, or investors care about a firm’s emissions, providing more firm-specific 
environmental information may cause consumers to adjust their purchase decisions, community groups to 
pressure firms to reduce pollution beyond that required by federal laws, or investors to change their 
portfolios.”). 
 24.   See Kleindorfer & Orts, supra note 1, at 165 (discussing how information regulation 
creates opportunities for tort-based lawsuits); Konar & Cohen, supra note 4, at 112 (theorizing that 
voluntary pollution reductions may deter lobbying by environmental groups for tighter regulatory 
standards); John W. Maxwell et al., Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of 
Corporate Environmentalism, 43 J.L. & ECON. 583, 583 (2000) (modeling the conditions under which 
firms will strategically self-regulate to preempt regulatory action). 
 25.   Even if disclosure does not reveal new information on a firm’s expected financial 
performance, capital markets might still penalize environmental laggards if socially responsible 
investors—i.e., those who design their portfolios to promote their morals, rather than to maximize their 
returns—make up a large enough share of traders. However, such an outcome would imply that capital 
markets are not efficient. As discussed in Section III.C below, there is a long-standing debate over whether 
capital markets are, in fact, efficient. 
 26.   See generally ESTY & WINSTON, supra note 16 (spelling out the multiple lines of 
logic for corporate sustainability strategies, including eco-efficiency, appeal to green consumers, and 
enhanced employee engagement in an increasingly sustainability-conscious world). 
 27.   Konar & Cohen, Why Do Firms Pollute (and Reduce) Toxic Emissions?, supra note 
7, at 13-14; Orlitzky, supra note 4, at 5-6. 
 28.   Robert G. Eccles et al., The Impact of Corporate Sustainability on Organizational 
Processes and Performance, 60 MGMT. SCI. 2835, 2835 (2014); Robert Innes & Abdoul G. Sam, 
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impede a firm’s ability to attract and retain high-quality talent, especially among 
millennials,29 with implications for the firm’s future performance.30 Ultimately, 
the responses of capital, consumer, and labor markets to mandatory disclosures 
of environmental information can create reinforcing incentives for firms to curb 
their pollution and improve their environmental practices.31 
Empirical research on the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) confirms that well-designed information 
regulations can improve corporate environmental performance.32 One of the 
most prominent and well-studied environmental disclosure policies to date, the 
TRI requires companies to publish standardized data on certain toxic chemical 
releases by industrial facilities.33 Notably, analyses of the program’s impacts 
show that the disclosures reduced the stock-market value of the regulated firms 
with higher-intensity polluters experiencing greater price drops.34 This market 
penalty, in turn, appears to have induced the companies to improve their 
environmental performance. For example, those that experienced the greatest 
stock-price reductions (1) reported the greatest reductions in TRI-covered 
chemical releases in subsequent years, (2) made significant improvements in 
other (non-TRI) areas of environmental performance, and (3) were more likely 
to avoid government fines for environmental violations.35 Notably, the incentive 
 
Voluntary Pollution Reductions and the Enforcement of Environmental Law: An Empirical Study of the 
33/50 Program, 51 J.L. & ECON. 271, 273 (2008). 
 29.   See 3/4 of Millennials Would Take a Pay Cut to Work for Socially Responsible 
Company, SUSTAINABLE BRANDS (Nov. 2, 2016), 
http://www.sustainablebrands.com/news_and_views/organizational_change/sustainable_brands/34_mill
ennials_would_take_pay_cut_work_socia [https://perma.cc/5Z9M-4HJM] (describing survey results 
showing that seventy-five percent of millennials consider a company’s social and environmental 
commitments when deciding where to work); Marissa Peretz, Want to Engage Millennials? Try Corporate 
Social Responsibility, FORBES (Sept. 27, 2017, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/marissaperetz/2017/09/27/want-to-engage-millennials-try-corporate-
social-responsibility [https://perma.cc/9M2R-H99E]. 
 30.   See, e.g., Kristin B. Backhaus et al., Exploring the Relationship Between Corporate 
Social Performance and Employer Attractiveness, 41 BUS. & SOC’Y 292, 292 (2002) (providing evidence 
that sustainability performance attracts higher-quality labor); Ante Glavas, Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Employee Engagement: Enabling Employees to Employ More of Their Whole Selves 
at Work, 7 FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. 1, 2 (2016) (reporting positive relationships between corporate social 
responsibility and employee engagement). 
 31.   E.g., Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 328; Fung & O’Rourke, supra note 4, at 120-22. 
 32.   Section 313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
(EPCRA) created the TRI program. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 313, 100 Stat. 1728, 1741 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2018)). 
 33.   Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program, EPA, (Nov. 8, 2018), 
https://www.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program [https://perma.cc/Y9UR-VGWS]. 
 34.   Higher-intensity polluters are those that release more toxic waste per dollar of 
revenue. See Hamilton, supra note 4, at 112. 
 35.   Case, supra note 6, at 10,777-79; see also Jeanne Herb et al., Harnessing the 
“Power of Information”: Environmental Right to Know as a Driver of Sound Environmental Policy, in 
NEW TOOLS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: EDUCATION, INFORMATION, AND VOLUNTARY 
MEASURES 254 (Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stern eds., 2002) (“The U.S. General Accounting Office 
estimated that over half of all TRI reporting facilities made one or more operational changes as a 
consequence of the inventory program.” (brackets omitted)). 
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to improve environmental performance did not subside after the first disclosure. 
Instead, markets appeared to continue penalizing poorly performing firms with 
each new disclosure of data,36 even after it had become clear which firms 
polluted the most in a given industry.37 
The success of the TRI at inducing voluntary38 pollution cuts has generated 
much speculation regarding the potential of information regulation to 
complement—or even substitute for—more traditional forms of environmental 
regulation.39 As compared to command-and-control regulations, for example, 
information disclosure requirements offer a “lighter” regulatory approach that 
intrudes less noticeably into the sphere of private markets.40 Instead of relying 
on agencies to police corporate behavior and set socially optimal environmental 
standards, information regulation relies on civil society, markets, and the public 
at large to (1) decide what constitutes “efficient” levels of pollution, (2) monitor 
corporate activities, and (3) penalize bad environmental actors.41 Furthermore, if 
the disclosed data allow for comparisons between firms and across time, 
information regulation can generate incentives for continuous environmental-
performance progress because firms feel pressure to not only reduce emissions 
against their own baselines but also to improve their rankings relative to their 
peers.42 In contrast, scholars have criticized command-and-control regulations 
for failing to incentivize—and perhaps even disincentivizing—pollution 
 
 36.   TRI disclosures occur annually. See Basics of TRI Reporting, EPA (Aug. 23, 2018), 
https://www.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program/basics-tri-reporting [https://perma.cc/2VBM-
4FW6]. 
 37.   Khanna et al., supra note 6, at 245. 
 38.   As used in this Article, “voluntary” means emissions reductions that exceed legal 
requirements. Of course, from the firm’s point of view, such reductions may not feel voluntary if they are 
undertaken in response to outside pressures from shareholders and customers. 
 39.   See Case, supra note 6, at 10,773 (“A number of consensus-building forums, expert 
panels, and policy reports argue that public distribution of information can serve as an effective policy 
tool for driving improvements in environmental performance.”); Konar & Cohen, supra note 4, at 109-10 
(“Information remedies have recently been touted as powerful supplements or alternatives to direct 
command-and-control regulation.”). 
 40.   See e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 291-93 (documenting the cost advantages of 
the Toxic Release Inventory program over traditional command-and-control regulations); Case, supra 
note 6, at 10,773 (“[I]nformation disclosure has emerged as a key component of strategies to promote 
more effective, less costly alternatives to command-and-control regulation.”). 
 41.   Professors Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart have discussed the difficulties that 
government agencies face when setting environmental standards. Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. 
Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1342-43 (1985); Richard B. Stewart, 
United States Environmental Regulation: A Failing Paradigm, 15 J.L. & COM. 585, 587-88 (1996). 
Professor Esty has argued elsewhere that information-disclosure regimes can help shift the locus of 
environmental decisionmaking from government agencies to consumers, investors, and companies. Esty, 
supra note 9, at 27-28. 
 42.   Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 261 (“Moreover, in contrast to fixed regulatory 
standards that effectively become performance ceilings as well as floors, TRI-induced benchmarking 
creates an implicit open-ended performance standard that demands continuous improvement in relation 
to one’s peers and to one’s own past performance.”); cf. ESTY & RUSHING, supra note 5, at 25 (arguing 
that comparative analysis and benchmarking can also incentivize governments to continuously improve 
on policy outcomes). 
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reductions beyond administratively mandated minimums.43 In this way, 
information regulation begins to move away from government-centered 
regulation and toward marketplace-imposed discipline and “self-regulation.”44 
To be clear, information regulation is not a silver bullet for environmental 
problems. True, information regulation can improve Coasian bargaining over 
environmental rights by reducing an important element of transaction costs: 
information asymmetry.45 But even if it eliminated information asymmetries 
entirely, society would still be far removed from the Coasian ideal—wherein 
private trading alone yields the socially efficient allocation of resources, 
regardless of the initial distribution of legal rights.46 A plethora of other 
transaction costs ranging from wealth effects to collective action problems 
hinder the ability of markets to fully redress environmental harms.47 Government 
action—above and beyond information disclosure requirements—is 
undoubtedly needed, including most importantly pricing the negative 
externalities produced by environmentally harmful behavior.48 Indeed, even if 
information asymmetries were the sole market failure at play, it is unlikely that 
disclosure requirements would suffice due to limitations and biases in people’s 
abilities to process information and assess risk.49 Thus, while information 
regulation can play an important role in furthering environmental goals, most 
scholars and policymakers see it as enhancing, rather than displacing, more 
traditional forms of environmental regulation.50 
 
 43.   See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 
407, 420 (1990) (arguing that technology-feasibility standards under the Clean Air Act perversely 
discourage innovation). But see David Popp, Innovation and Climate Policy, 2 ANN. REV. RESOURCE 
ECON. 275, 283-84 (2010) (reviewing recent research that has complicated the perceived comparative 
effectiveness of market-based policies and command-and-control regimes at incentivizing innovation in 
pollution mitigation technologies). 
 44.   Esty, supra note 9, at 37 (arguing for a shift away from “government-centered” 
environmental protection and toward involving more actors in environmental decisionmaking); Stewart, 
supra note 6, at 131 (“Self-regulation implies that an organization determines the means to reach 
environmental goals and, at least to some degree, the goals as well. Thus, government is less involved i[n] 
setting targets and[] often the program is voluntary.”). Notably, information regulation also promises to 
reduce the costs of regulation to government itself, since it shifts monitoring and standard-setting costs to 
markets, NGOs, and the media. See Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 261. 
 45.   Kleindorfer & Orts, supra note 1, at 161; see also Esty, supra note 3, at 115 
(“Inadequate information and related transaction costs make Coasian contractual exchanges of 
environmental rights infeasible in many circumstances.”); Steven G. Medema, The Coase Theorem, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 854 (2013) (identifying information asymmetries as a key 
transaction cost). 
 46.   See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 
(1960) (first articulating the Coase Theorem). 
 47.   Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1471, 1483 (1998) (outlining these various transaction costs). 
 48.   Esty & Cort, supra note 14, at 15 (stressing the limitations of information disclosure 
when regulations let externalities remain uninternalized). 
 49.   See Stewart, supra note 6, at 141-42 (discussing these information-processing 
problems); Sunstein, supra note 1, at 626-29. 
 50.   E.g., Case, supra note 1, at 387 (“[E]xtant scholarship reflects that disclosure 
strategies are imperfect substitutes for direct legal controls on environmental conduct.”); Peter W. 
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B. What It Should Focus On 
To date, most academic analysts and regulators have viewed mandatory 
disclosure requirements as a tool for policing bad environmental conduct and for 
driving markets away from environmental laggards. In other words, they see the 
purpose of environmental information regulation as establishing a series of red 
lights that drive polluters to stop their harm-causing conduct—and incentivize 
environmental improvements by naming and shaming the worst performers in 
an industry. 
Case in point: existing environmental information regulations are largely 
designed to produce data on the environmental harms, risks, and liabilities of 
firms at the bottom of the environmental performance distribution. For example, 
the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and other major federal environmental 
statutes require regulated entities to report on various pollution discharges to 
determine their compliance with minimum regulatory standards.51 Thus, these 
disclosure requirements aim to identify those who fall below specified, baseline 
performance thresholds rather than those who exceed them. Likewise, federal 
securities laws require publicly traded companies to disclose a variety of 
environmental liabilities, including the costs of compliance with environmental 
regulations, penalties incurred, and any litigation arising under environmental 
laws.52 Here again, information disclosure works primarily to separate 
environmental laggards from the pack. The same goes for environmental 
information regulations that target products sold on the market. These disclosure 
regimes, which take the form of product-labeling requirements, tend to focus on 
the product’s environmental harms and risks. 53 
In focusing on environmental harms, liabilities, and laggards, these 
information schemes incentivize environmental improvements primarily by 
penalizing the worst polluters.54 This certainly has been the case for the TRI—
 
Kennedy et al., Pollution Policy: The Role for Publicly Provided Information, 26 J. ENVTL. ECON. & 
MGMT. 31, 42 (1994); Stewart, supra note 6, at 141. 
 51.   Case, supra note 1, at 391-92. 
 52.   Id. at 392. 
 53.   The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), for example, 
requires warning labels for hazardous pesticides. See 5 PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY: 
NATURE, LAW, & SOCIETY 649-63 (2016) (providing an overview of FIFRA). Likewise, California’s 
Proposition 65 requires warning labels for products containing chemicals that may cause cancer or 
reproductive harm. See Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warning Game: Evaluating Warnings Under 
California’s Proposition 65, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303, 305 (1996) (assessing the practical effects of 
Proposition 65’s warning requirement). 
 54.   Whether existing disclosure programs are effective at changing corporate 
environmental behavior is another matter. See Case, supra note 1, at 393 (“[E]nvironmental disclosure 
required under various environmental statutes and federal securities laws was not intentionally designed 
as informational regulation—that is, with widespread public information access and dissemination as 
primary goals. These reporting requirements are described as ‘fragmentary,’ ‘uncoordinated,’ ‘chaotic,’ 
and intended primarily to determine minimal compliance with regulatory standards.”). 
 Harnessing Investor Interest in Sustainability 
637 
the gold standard of environmental information regulation.55 Research shows 
that public releases of TRI data lowered stock market prices for the vast majority 
of TRI-regulated entities. Indeed, according to one careful analysis, TRI-
registered firms lost an average of $4.1 million in stock value on the day of the 
first TRI disclosure, with the worst polluters hit the hardest.56 Subsequent 
disclosures of TRI data in later years continued to result in aggregate losses for 
registered firms.57 Thus, even as companies reduced their volume of toxic 
releases in response to the initial disclosure, the overwhelming effect of the TRI 
has been to penalize, rather than reward, firms for their pollution practices. 
Furthermore, the TRI—like the other environmental information schemes 
described above—provides the greatest incentives to those at the bottom of the 
environmental performance distribution. Economists Shameek Konar and Mark 
Cohen, for example, show that the firms whose stock prices declined the most 
due to the first TRI data disclosure made the biggest environmental gains in 
subsequent years.58 In contrast, environmental leaders—as measured according 
to the initial TRI data release—made only marginal improvements in their 
environmental performance.59 As a result, the forty worst firms largely caught 
up to their better performing peers within three years of the initial TRI data 
disclosure.60 The program, in other words, primarily impacted the performance 
of environmental laggards, not environmental leaders. While effective at driving 
markets away from the worst performers, it appears to have done little to direct 
markets toward environmental leaders.61 Its gains have largely resulted from 
 
 55.   See, e.g., Case, supra note 1, at 381-82 (noting that the “notoriety of the Toxics 
Release Inventory” sparked policy interest in environmental information regulation); Case, supra note 6, 
at 10,775 (“Although numerous examples of informational regulatory approaches exist in the 
environmental arena, [the TRI] is perhaps the most widely analyzed example of this approach.”); Cohen, 
supra note 7, at 10425 (noting that the TRI sparked “considerable interest in environmental information 
disclosure”); Fung & O’Rourke, supra note 4, at 115 (musing that the TRI “may be the most successful 
environmental regulation of the last ten years”); Herb et al., supra note 35, at 253; Karkkainen, supra note 
1, at 280 (calling the TRI a “watershed”); Kleindorfer & Orts, supra note 1, at 155 (identifying the TRI 
as “[o]ne of the best known” examples of environmental information regulation). 
 56.   Hamilton, supra note 4, at 112. 
 57.   Khanna et al., supra note 6, at 245. 
 58.   Specifically, while the forty most heavily penalized firms subsequently reduced 
their pollution intensity by an average of 1.84 pounds per thousand dollars of revenue, their peer firms 
only reduced pollution intensities by 0.17 pounds per thousand. Konar & Cohen, supra note 4, at 120. 
 59.   Id. 
 60.   Id. 
 61.   Civic society’s responses to TRI disclosures further confirm that the regulation 
worked primarily to call out and penalize bad actors. Several environmental groups, for example, used the 
data to compile a list of the worst TRI-polluters. Media coverage likewise focused narrowly on the largest 
polluters. TRI disclosures produced few positive narratives, even for those companies that had improved 
their environmental performance. Rather, media accounts largely served as warnings to consumers, 
markets, and society at large of the dangers posed by TRI laggards, thereby reinforcing the incentives to 
divest from environmental laggards without providing noticeable incentives to invest in environmental 
leaders. See Fung & O’Rourke, supra note 4, at 121 (finding media coverage of the TRI program 
“frequently take[s] the form of blacklists that single out one or a small number of facilities as the ‘worst’ 
environmental performers”); Konar & Cohen, supra note 4, at 110, 114. 
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lifting the bottom of the environmental performance distribution rather than from 
incentivizing improvements at the top. 
These findings should not come as a surprise. They are in line with 
mainstream academic thinking, which understands environmental information 
regulation as a regulatory stick used to drive markets away from bad actors. For 
example, when explaining the mechanisms by which mandatory disclosures can 
induce environmental performance improvements, seminal scholars in the field 
invariably tell a story of how data on environmental harms induce consumers, 
investors, and workers to leave or avoid the worst performers in an industry.62 
Put simply, they conceptualize environmental information disclosure as 
establishing a system of red lights that warn markets away from environmental 
laggards. Rarely, if at all, do they frame environmental information regulation as 
a mechanism for guiding markets toward environmental leaders.63 
Contrary, then, to the established consensus, this Article argues that 
mandatory disclosure requirements can and should be deployed to guide markets 
toward environmental leaders. It contends, in particular, that an information 
system composed solely of red lights will not fully harness investors’ growing 
interest in sustainability. Rather, these investors need—but do not yet have—
informational green lights that will help them identify and invest in sustainability 
leadership. Through carefully designed information regulations, policymakers 
can address these needs—and thereby work to align capital markets with 
sustainability goals. 
II. Investor Interest in Sustainability: Opportunities & Obstacles 
The need to expand environmental information regulation beyond the 
standard red-lights model stems from a recent groundswell of interest in 
sustainability among mainstream investors. This Part examines this 
transformation in the investment world—and its implications for environmental 
 
 62.   See, e.g., Fung & O’Rourke, supra note 4, at 120 (explaining how the TRI “induces 
continual reduction of toxic releases by pressuring whoever happens to fall at the bottom of the list”); 
Herb et al., supra note 35, at 257 (explaining how “the public disclosure of industry environmental 
performance will motivate industry to take actions to prevent itself from being viewed as a poor 
environmental performer”); Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 295 (explaining how the TRI uses external 
actors—e.g., markets—to “exert powerful pressures on poor performers to up-grade their [environmental] 
performance”); Konar & Cohen, supra note 4, at 110, 111 (observing that mandatory disclosure only 
works if “the ‘public’ cares enough about the information being released to ‘punish’ firms that are bad 
actors” and hypothesizing that, “[i]f the provision of [] information negatively impacts the financial 
performance of the firm, it will provide a strong incentive to the firm to become a better environmental 
actor”); Sulkowski & White, supra note 7, at 503 (explaining how environmental information regulation 
harnesses investors and consumers to “bad actors . . . for creating risks and liabilities”). 
 63.   To be sure, academics have developed a voluminous literature on how voluntary 
labeling schemes—such as organic food labels or the Department of Energy’s Energy Star program—can 
attract consumers to environmentally beneficial products. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 6, at 136-39. But 
such initiatives are distinguishable from mandatory disclosure requirements. As discussed below in 
Section III.A of this Article, voluntary environmental disclosure regimes will not be sufficient to fully 
harness mainstream investor interest in sustainability. 
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information regulation. To begin, Section II.A reviews the literature on the 
relationship between sustainability leadership and financial profits. While far 
from settled, the extant research suggests that corporate sustainability 
performance can enhance corporate financial performance in some, but not all, 
instances. This body of work has helped move sustainability from the fringes of 
the investment world into the mainstream, as documented in Section II.B. 
These new sustainability-minded investors, however, differ from the 
socially responsible investors of old in at least two important ways. First, they 
care about their portfolio returns, although they vary greatly in terms of their 
willingness to sacrifice profits for sustainability considerations. Second, they 
seek a more nuanced approach toward integrating sustainability into their 
investment strategies. While socially responsible investors will often 
categorically exclude entire industries from their portfolios, today’s 
sustainability-minded mainstream investors often seek to bring a sustainability 
tilt to their portfolios by strategically divesting from sustainability laggards and 
investing in sustainability leaders. Section II.C then explains how the current 
patchwork of mandatory and voluntary disclosure regimes fails to satisfy the 
information needs of mainstream investors. While the current system provides a 
series of sustainability red lights that crudely correlate with business 
fundamentals, mainstream investors are looking for a set of sustainability red and 
green lights that materially relate to corporate financial performance. This 
information deficit, in turn, has slowed the translation of sustainability interest 
into sustainable investing. 
A. Does Sustainability Leadership Pay Off? 
Traditionally, academics and the business community have viewed the 
financial value of sustainability with skepticism.64 Adopting a neoclassical 
theory of markets and firm behavior, these critics have argued that corporate 
sustainability initiatives—such as reducing pollution beyond legally mandated 
levels—increase operation costs, reduce profits, and therefore place firms at a 
competitive disadvantage.65 Thus, according to this theory, pursuing any 
 
 64.   Jan Endrikat, Market Reactions to Corporate Environmental Performance Related 
Events: A Meta-Analytic Consolidation of the Empirical Evidence, 138 J. BUS. ETHICS 535, 537 (2016) 
(“[T]he early literature rooted in neoclassical economics argued that environmental activities would 
withdraw financial resources from a firm and thus weaken its financial performance because the financial 
benefits of activities are deemed to be lower than their costs.”); Andrew King & Michael Lenox, Exploring 
the Locus of Profitable Pollution Reduction, 48 MGMT. SCI. 289, 289 (2002) (“Historically, scholars have 
argued that discretionary reductions in pollution by firms should lead to lower financial performance.”). 
 65.   See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 13, 1970), 
https://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/miltonfriedman1970.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LJ7-
377F]. 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 36, 2019 
640 
considerations outside of a narrow, profit-maximization framework will 
invariably hurt the company’s bottom line.66 
In recent years, however, a growing body of research has pushed back 
against the idea that investments in sustainability invariably come at the cost of 
corporate financial performance.67 Instead, it has identified “win-win”68 or 
“green-to-gold”69 opportunities wherein sustainability leadership pays off in 
financial terms. Leading on sustainability can, for example, drive top- and 
bottom-line growth by improving organizational reputation and brand name.70 
Through these and other mediators, investments in sustainability can attract 
higher-quality employees,71 increase customer loyalty,72 reduce transaction costs 
with suppliers,73 and appeal to green consumers who are willing to pay eco-
premiums for their goods and services.74 In addition to strengthening the firm’s 
 
 66.   Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Jan.-Feb. 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/01/the-big-idea-creating-shared-value [https://perma.cc/6B2W-
RWFM] (“In neoclassical thinking, a requirement for social improvement . . . imposes a constraint on the 
corporation. Adding a constraint to a firm that is already maximizing profits, says the theory, will 
inevitably raise costs and reduce those profits.”). 
 67.   For a detailed, narrative review of this literature, see generally Stefan Ambec & 
Paul Lanoie, Does It Pay to Be Green? A Systematic Overview, 22 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 45 (2008). 
 68.   The potential existence of “win-win” situations has come to be known as the Porter 
Hypothesis. See Paul Lanoie et al., Environmental Policy, Innovation and Performance: New Insights on 
the Porter Hypothesis, 20 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 803, 804 (2011). For the first articulations of this 
theory, see generally Porter & van der Linde, supra note 16; and Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, 
Green and Competitive: Ending the Stalemate, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept.-Oct. 1995), 
https://hbr.org/1995/09/green-and-competitive-ending-the-stalemate [https://perma.cc/ZJN6-QKJY]. 
 69.   ESTY & WINSTON, supra note 16. 
 70.   Stephen Brammer & Stephen Pavelin, Building a Good Reputation, 22 EUR. MGMT. 
J. 704, 704 (2004) (discussing the link between CSR and company reputation); Heather R. Dixon-Fowler 
et al., Beyond “Does It Pay to be Green?” A Meta-Analysis of Moderators of the CEP-CFP Relationship, 
112 J. BUS. ETHICS 353, 354 (2013) (describing how “firms with strong environmental performance might 
reap reputational benefits”); Tiago Melo & Jose Ignacio Galan, Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility 
on Brand Value, 18 J. BRAND MGMT. 423, 423 (2011) (finding that corporate social responsibility has a 
positive impact on brand value); Orlitzky, supra note 4, at 5 (“From theoretical and practical perspectives, 
organizational reputation ranks as one of the most important mediating variables linking [corporate 
sustainability] to [corporate financial performance].”). 
 71.   See, e.g., Backhaus, supra note 30, at 293 (reviewing literature showing that 
“organization image influences the firm’s ability to attract applicants”); Daniel W. Greening & Daniel B. 
Turban, Corporate Social Performance as a Competitive Advantage in Attracting a Quality Workforce, 
39 BUS. & SOC’Y 254, 254 (2000) (explaining how signaling theory and social-identity theory predict that 
corporate social-performance activities will attract higher-quality job applicants). 
 72.   See, e.g., Ambec & Lanoie, supra note 67, at 47; Eccles et al., supra note 28, at 
2850 (reviewing literature showing that sustainability practices affect a variety of consumer outcomes). 
 73.   See, e.g., Porter & Kramer, supra note 66, at 10. 
 74.   See, e.g., ESTY & WINSTON, supra note 16, at 135-42 (discussing various ways well 
designed corporate environmental strategies can deliver “eco-advantage” in the marketplace); Elisabeth 
Albertini, Does Environmental Management Improve Financial Performance? A Meta-Analytical 
Review, 26 ORG. & ENV’T 431, 434 (2013) (“Differentiation advantage creates the potential to increase 
product selling prices that results in higher revenues.”); Sheila Bonini & Jeremy Oppenheim, Cultivating 
the Green Consumer, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 56 (2008) (documenting growing corporate interest 
in attracting green consumers); Innes & Sam, supra note 28, at 271; Stephanie M. Tully & Russell S. 
Winer, The Role of the Beneficiary in Willingness to Pay for Socially Responsible Products: A Meta-
Analysis, 90 J. RETAILING (2014) (providing meta-analysis showing that consumers are willing to pay 
significantly more for socially responsible products); Mehdi Miremadi et al., How Much Will Consumers 
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position vis-à-vis external stakeholders, the development of strong sustainability 
practices can improve the internal efficiency of the company by streamlining 
firm operations, eliminating waste, improving resource use,75 enhancing key 
managerial competencies, and catalyzing corporate innovations.76 
Importantly, this literature has identified sustainability leaders as a class 
unto themselves.77 Sustainability leaders do not simply implement more 
sustainability initiatives than their peers. They take a fundamentally different 
approach toward sustainability. While some companies view environmental 
concerns, such as pollution control, as a fringe issue, sustainability leaders 
integrate sustainability considerations into their core business model.78 That is, 
they treat sustainability not only as a risk to be mitigated at the margins, but as a 
key arena for delivering productivity gains and future revenue growth.79 Rather 
than adopting sustainability practices in response to existing regulatory 
constraints and pressures, they proactively invest in sustainability as a business 
strategy to enhance short- and long-term growth.80 In doing so, they recognize 
 
Pay to Go Green?, MCKINSEY Q. (Oct. 2012), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-
functions/sustainability-and-resource-productivity/our-insights/how-much-will-consumers-pay-to-go-
green [https://perma.cc/HZE7-CREQ] (presenting survey evidence showing consumers’ willingness to 
pay more for sustainable products). 
 75.   See Porter & van der Linde, supra note 68 (arguing that “pollution often is a form 
of economic waste”). 
 76.   Albertini, supra note 74, at 434 (“Through this framing, environmental practices 
are considered to result in strategic improvements by reassessing taken-for-granted engineering practices, 
rules of thumb, and protocols.”). 
 77.   THE CONF. BOARD, THE SEVEN PILLARS OF SUSTAINABILITY LEADERSHIP ¶ 1 
(2016) (identifying “seven pillars of sustainability leadership” that distinguish top sustainability 
companies from the pack, including embedding sustainability into the company’s innovation process and 
tying executive compensation to sustainability performance); Robert G. Eccles et al., How to Become a 
Sustainable Company, 55 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 43, 44 (2012) (arguing that sustainability leadership 
may require a complete reframing of the company’s identity); Sheila Bonini & Anne-Titia Bové, 
Sustainability’s Strategic Worth, MCKINSEY & CO. fig.5 (July 2014), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability-and-resource-productivity/our-
insights/sustainabilitys-strategic-worth-mckinsey-global-survey-results [https://perma.cc/2595-BS2Z] 
(distinguishing sustainability leaders on a variety of organizational characteristics, including whether a 
company has aggressive external sustainability targets, a unified sustainability strategy, and leadership 
buy-in). 
 78.   See Lubin & Esty, supra note 16, at 4 (explaining how market leaders in the past 
“drove revenue growth by integrating innovative approaches into their core strategies”); Sheila Bonini & 
Stephan Görner, The Business of Sustainability, MCKINSEY & CO. (Oct. 2011), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability-and-resource-productivity/our-insights/the-
business-of-sustainability-mckinsey-global-survey-results [https://perma.cc/9KU7-V2CP] (finding that a 
handful of leading companies are capturing significant value by systematically integrating sustainability 
into their business operations). 
 79.   ESTY & WINSTON, supra note 16, at 11; David A. Lubin & Daniel C. Esty, Bridging 
the Sustainability Gap, MIT SLOANE MGMT. REV. 19-20 (2014) (outlining a sustainability-based “value 
driver model” focused on growth and productivity as well as risk); Porter & Kramer, supra note 66, at 10 
(describing how product and supply-chain redesign around sustainability principles can unlock new 
growth opportunities for companies); Bonini & Görner, supra note 78, at 13 (“[M]ost companies do not 
actively seek opportunities to invest in any area of sustainability and therefore miss potential growth 
opportunities.”). 
 80.   See Endrikat, supra note 64, at 738 (discussing the advantages of proactive 
sustainability strategies over reactive ones). 
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sustainability as “an emerging megatrend”—an economic and societal 
transformation that will fundamentally alter how companies compete.81 While 
most executives understand that sustainability pressures—including, most 
notably, climate change and resource scarcity—will profoundly reshape markets 
in the twenty-first century,82 sustainability leaders are taking strategic actions 
now. They see both the existential risks from responding too late to the 
“sustainability imperative” and the profitable upsides from getting ahead of this 
impending societal shift.83 As Professors Esty and Lubin explain, sustainability 
leaders are “placing strategic bets on innovation in energy efficiency, renewable 
power, resource productivity, and pollution control” in order to enhance “their 
companies’ long-term competitiveness.”84 Other scholars have similarly pointed 
out that the real opportunities for sustainability-driven growth come when 
companies integrate sustainability into their core business functions (i.e., become 
sustainability leaders), rather than when companies merely address sustainability 
at the margins.85 
 
 81.   Lubin & Esty, supra note 16, at 1 (identifying electrification, the rise of mass 
production, globalization, and the quality movement of the 1970s and 1980s as other business 
“megatrends”). 
 82.   See Gina Iacona, Going Green to Make Green: Necessary Changes to Promote and 
Implement Corporate Social Responsibility While Increasing the Bottom Line, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. 
L. 113, 121 (2010) (reviewing survey evidence showing recognition among corporate executives that 
sustainability was important to corporate growth); Bonini & Görner, supra note 78, at 5 tbl.3 (2011) 
(showing that more than three quarters of CEOs surveyed identified sustainability as a priority in their 
global agenda); id. at 3 fig.2 (survey results showing that twice as many global CEOs reported in 2014 
that sustainability was their top priority than 2012); Global Compact, CEO Study on Sustainability 2013: 
Architects of a Better World, UNITED NATIONS 11 (Sept. 2013), 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/UNGC_Accenture_CEO_Study_2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GT8K-TBYN] (finding that in a 2013 survey of one thousand CEOs from across the 
world, ninety-three percent reported sustainability as “key to success”). 
 83.   See generally Lubin & Esty, supra note 16. 
 84.   Id. at 3. 
 85.   See, e.g., 2 MARC J. EPSTEIN & ADRIANA REJC BUHOVAC, MAKING 
SUSTAINABILITY WORK: BEST PRACTICES IN MANAGING AND MEASURING CORPORATE SOCIAL, 
ENVIRONMENTAL, AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS 3 (2014) (“For sustainability to be valuable to both the 
organization and its stakeholders, it must be integrated into the way a company does business.”); LUCY 
NOTTINGHAM, MARSH & MCLENNAN COMPANIES, UNLOCKING GROWTH BY INTEGRATING 
SUSTAINABILITY: HOW TO OVERCOME THE BARRIERS 3 (2016) (“It is clear that corporate sustainability 
approaches must move from ‘nice to have’ efforts to promote the company and create employee 
engagement to a means to drive growth, manage risks to corporate earnings, and engage with financial 
markets.”); Jan Endrikat et al., Making Sense of Conflicting Empirical Findings: A Meta-Analytic Review 
of the Relationship Between Corporate Environmental and Financial Performance, 32 EUR. MGMT. J. 
735, 735 (2014) (finding that proactive corporate environmental initiatives have a more positive impact 
on financial performance than reactive ones); Michael V. Russo & Paul A. Fouts, A Resource-Based 
Perspective on Corporate Environmental Performance and Profitability, 40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 534, 537-
38 (1997) (explaining why proactive environmental initiatives, which go beyond regulatory standards and 
involve process redesign, should generate more value than reactive ones, which simply comply with “end-
of-pipe compliance policies”). But see Dixon-Fowler, supra note 70, at 362 (finding that both proactive 
and reactive environmental initiatives positively impact corporate financial performance to equal degrees, 
and speculating that there is enough “‘low-hanging’ fruit available for [reactive] solutions to be still 
profitable, although this could change over time as they run out”). 
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For example, Unilever, the consumer products giant, has distinguished 
itself as a corporate sustainability leader through its Sustainable Living Plan.86 
Launched in 2010, this ambitious corporate action plan promised to revamp the 
company’s business model around a series of aggressive sustainability targets.87 
By 2020, Unilever pledged to double its revenues while halving the 
environmental footprint of its products, sourcing all of its agricultural raw 
materials sustainably and integrating half a million small-scale farmers and 
distributors into its supply chains.88 Toward those ends, the company has 
aggressively and holistically integrated sustainability practices into its 
governance structures, product lines, management practices, and supply chains.89 
For example, Unilever has linked executive pay to sustainability targets, 
developed a central team dedicated to spreading best sustainability practices 
across the company’s diverse operations, worked to improve the eco-efficiency 
of its supply chains through collaborations with its suppliers, sought advice from 
an external sustainable development advisory board,90 and placed environmental 
and social responsibility at the core of its brand communications and strategies.91 
Moreover, Unilever CEO Paul Polman made it clear that he views sustainability 
as a revenue-growth strategy.92 Accordingly, the company has focused its efforts 
on identifying and exploiting the profit upsides to sustainability. 
From an environmental perspective, these efforts have delivered 
measurable gains. Since 2008, the company has cut carbon emissions and water 
consumption at its factories by 47% and 39%, respectively.93 And in 2017, 
Unilever reported that it had reduced the waste associated with the disposal of 
 
 86.   In surveys of sustainability experts, Unilever has consistently dominated corporate 
sustainability leadership rankings. See, e.g., The 2015 Sustainability Leaders, GLOBALSCAN & 
SUSTAINABILITY 4 (2015), https://globescan.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/GlobeScan-
SustainAbility-Survey-Sustainability-Leaders-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/LLC2-PZ79]. 
 87.   Our Sustainable Living Report Hub, UNILEVER, 
https://www.unilever.com/sustainable-living/our-sustainable-living-report-hub [https://perma.cc/HT23-
ZV5E]. 
 88.   Unilever, Unilever Sustainable Living Plan, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2011, 11:00 
PM EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/unilever-sustainable-living-plan 
[https://perma.cc/MC9B-DUQW]. 
 89.   See BusinessGreen Staff, Unilever’s Sustainability Program Saves $395M Since 
2008, GREENBIZ (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:00 AM), https://www.greenbiz.com/news/2013/04/18/unilever-
sustainability-program-saves-395m [https://perma.cc/LA6H-6YAH] (documenting some of Unilever’s 
sustainability initiatives); Michael Holder, Unilever Reports Strong Growth for ‘Sustainable Living’ 
Brands, GREENBIZ (May 19, 2016, 12:20 AM), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/unilever-reports-
strong-growth-sustainable-living-brands [https://perma.cc/AQ6X-PLCR] (same). 
 90.   Professor Esty served on this advisory board from 1996 to 2011. 
 91.   Unilever: In Search of the Good Business, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 9, 2014), 
https://www.economist.com/business/2014/08/09/in-search-of-the-good-business 
[https://perma.cc/M5QN-F3NM]. 
 92.   Vivienne Walt, Unilever CEO Paul Polman’s Plan to Save the World, FORTUNE 
(Feb. 17, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/17/unilever-paul-polman-responsibility-growth 
[https://perma.cc/7YZ6-HL9K]. 
 93.   Sustainable Living Plan: 3 Year Summary of Progress, UNILEVER (May 2018), 
https://www.unilever.com/Images/uslp-targets-3-year-summary-of-progress_tcm244-526543_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AG57-C63W]. 
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its products by 29%, cut the weight of its products’ packaging by 13%, and 
obtained 56% of its agricultural materials from sustainable sources.94 Thanks to 
these and other eco-efficiency measures, Unilever has avoided over seven 
hundred million euros in costs since 2008 by cutting its waste; reducing its use 
of energy, raw materials, and natural resources; and limiting its exposure to 
resource-price volatility.95 While a causal link would be hard to prove, 
Unilever’s sustainability initiatives also appear to have helped the company 
improve its market position. Unilever reported that, in 2017, its “sustainable 
living” brands—which represent Unilever’s most sustainable product lines—
grew 46% faster than the rest of its business and accounted for 70% of the 
company’s turnover growth.96 The company’s stock value has also grown by 
more than 15% since 2009, even as other consumer-product giants, such as 
Proctor & Gamble, Campbell Soup, and Kellogg, have struggled in recent 
years.97 Given how central sustainability is to Unilever’s business model and 
brand image, the company’s outperformance of its peers is suggestive, although 
by no means dispositive, of the profit potential of sustainability leadership. 
While Unilever is exceptional in its alignment of core business functions 
with sustainability principles, its success at turning sustainability into revenue 
growth probably is not a fluke. Rather, it appears to be illustrative of the profit 
potential of becoming a sustainability leader.98 In particular, empirical work on 
 
 94.   Id. 
 95.   Unilever’s Sustainable Living Brands Continue to Drive Higher Rates of Growth, 
UNILEVER (May 18, 2017), https://www.unilever.com/news/press-releases/2017/unilevers-sustainable-
living-brands-continue-to-drive-higher-rates-of-growth.html [https://perma.cc/B6FA-UWJ2]; 
Commitment to Sustainability Delivers Even Faster Growth for Unilever, UNILEVER (May 16, 2016), 
https://www.unilever.com/news/press-releases/2016/Commitment-to-sustainability-delivers-even-faster-
growth-for-Unilever.html [https://perma.cc/26ND-A6VU]. For example, Unilever’s waste disposal 
program has achieved approximately 262 million euros in cost avoidance, primarily by reducing 
Unilever’s production of waste (which eliminates the costs of managing and disposing of the company’s 
waste), recycling and repurposing waste for additional internal use (which lowers input and resource 
costs), and selling waste streams to third parties to generate additional income (e.g., selling used paper, 
plastics, metal, and glass to other industries). See Going Beyond Zero Waste to Landfill, UNILEVER, 
https://www.unilever.com/sustainable-living/reducing-environmental-impact/waste-and-
packaging/going-beyond-zero-waste-to-landfill [https://perma.cc/7FC7-MWM2]; Jessica Lyons 
Hardcastle, Unilever Chief Supply Chain Officer on How to Achieve Zero Waste, ENVIRONMENTAL 
LEADER (Feb. 15, 2016), https://www.environmentalleader.com/2016/02/unilever-chief-supply-chain-
office-on-how-to-achieve-zero-waste [https://perma.cc/BKZ9-PQPZ]. Meanwhile, Unilever’s energy 
efficiency program has yielded an estimated 493 million euros in cost savings by cutting the company’s 
energy consumption by twenty-six percent. See Our Eco-Efficiency Performance, UNILEVER, 
https://www.unilever.com/sustainable-living/reducing-environmental-impact/eco-efficiency-in-
manufacturing/our-eco-efficiency-performance [https://perma.cc/R7J9-E8PT]. 
 96.   Unilever’s Sustainable Living Brands Delivered 70% of Turnover Growth in 2017, 
SUSTAINABLE BRANDS (May 10, 2018), 
https://www.sustainablebrands.com/news_and_views/business_case/sustainable_brands/unilevers_sustai
nable_living_brands_delivered_70_tur [https://perma.cc/DH3C-PEAQ]. 
 97.   Bill George, As Consumer Giants Struggle, Unilever Rises Above the Pack, CNBC 
(May 25, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/25/bill-george-as-consumer-giants-struggle-unilever-
rises-above-the-pack.html [https://perma.cc/ETK9-4SXD]. 
 98.   To be clear, while Unilever stands out as a leader on corporate sustainability, it is 
not alone. Other companies have similarly attempted to reorient their business models around 
sustainability practices and principles. See, e.g., ESTY & WINSTON, supra note 16, at 122-44 (providing 
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corporate sustainability has increasingly lent support to the idea that, under the 
right circumstances, there may be a systematic relationship between 
sustainability leadership and a company’s bottom line.99 Meta-analyses100 of the 
literature, for example, have consistently identified positive relationships 
between corporate sustainability practices and corporate financial 
performance.101 Indeed, the five most recently published meta-analyses found 
strong evidence that at least some sustainability initiatives pay off.102 This 
conclusion has been echoed by a number of prominent narrative reviews of the 
empirical research. For instance, based on a survey of 190 academic studies, 
researchers at Oxford University and Arabesque Partners concluded that 
sustainability practices can enhance operational performance, lower the cost of 
capital, and improve stock price performance.103 
 
numerous examples of companies that have used sustainability practices to drive growth). For example, 
in 2005, General Electric launched its Ecomagination initiative, in which it pledged to generate $20 billion 
in annual revenue from sustainable products by 2010. See id. at 122. By 2009, annual revenue from 
Ecomagination products had reached $25 billion. See Joel Makower, Ecomagination at 10: A Status 
Report, GREENBIZ (May 11, 2015, 1:11 AM), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/ecomagination-10-
status-report [https://perma.cc/8EPU-X4WZ]. During this time, Ecomagination sales also grew twice as 
fast as total company sales. See Andrew Winston, GE Is Avoiding Hard Choices About Ecomagination, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 1, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/08/ges-failure-of-ecomagination 
[https://perma.cc/W67B-NJ93]. After having invested $17 billion into Ecomagination research and 
development, General Electric had reaped more than $232 billion from the initiative by 2015. See Jasper 
Scherer, How GE Is Changing the World, FORTUNE (August 19, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/08/19/general-electric-change-world [https://perma.cc/U9H5-TQZY]. While the 
Ecomagination program has come under fire in recent years for investing in technologies to reduce 
greenhouse gases from Canadian oil sands production, the first ten years of the initiative have been widely 
touted as a success at harnessing sustainability to generate profits. See Winston, supra note 98. 
 99.   See, e.g., Eccles et al., supra note 28, at 2835 (finding that “high sustainability” 
companies that “voluntarily adopted sustainability policies by 1993 . . . outperform[ed] their counterparts 
over the long term, both in terms of stock market and accounting performance”). 
 100.   Meta-analyses employ econometric methods to aggregate and synthesize findings 
across individual studies. 
 101.   See, e.g., Friede et al., supra note 16, at 210 (stating that of the more than two 
thousand empirical articles published on the market value of sustainability since the 1970s, roughly ninety 
percent found nonnegative relationships between ESG factors and corporate financial performance, with 
the vast majority reporting positive associations); Susan L. Golicic & Carlo D. Smith, A Meta-Analysis of 
Environmentally Sustainable Supply Chain Management Practices and Firm Performance, 49 J. SUPPLY 
CHAIN MGMT. 78, 78 (2013) (finding that “the link between environmental supply chain practices and 
market-based, operational-based and accounting-based forms of financial performance is positive and 
significant”); Marc Orlitzky, Does Firm Size Confound the Relationship Between Corporate Social 
Performance and Firm Financial Performance?, 33 J. BUS. ETHICS 167, 167 (2001) (“[E]ven if firm size 
is controlled for across studies (comprising, on average, over fifteen thousand observations), 
[sustainability] and [corporate financial performance] remain positively correlated.”); Marc Orlitzky & 
John D. Benjamin, Corporate Social Performance and Firm Risk: A Meta-Analytic Review, 40 BUS. & 
SOC’Y 369, 391 (2001) (finding “the better a firm’s [sustainability] reputation, the lower its [market] 
risk”); Marc Orlitzky et al., Corporate Social and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 24 
ORGANIZATIONAL STUD. 403, 403 (“The meta-analytic findings suggest that corporate virtue . . . is likely 
to pay off.”). 
 102.   Albertini, supra note 74, at 431; Dixon-Fowler, supra note 70, at 353; Endrikat, 
supra note 64, at 535; Endrikat, supra note 85, at 735; Friede et al., supra note 16, at 210. 
 103.   Clark et al., supra note 12, at 9; see also Ambec & Lanoie, supra note 67, at 57 
(providing a comprehensive, narrative review of the literature that points to a number of “win-win” 
investments in sustainability). 
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This view, however, has not been universally adopted. Well-respected 
researchers continue to question the materiality of sustainability to profits, 
arguing that the scope of “win-win” opportunities is narrower than most 
believe.104 Backing these conclusions is a steady stream of case studies and 
empirical analyses that find negative associations between financial performance 
and corporate environmental management.105 Indeed, researchers have identified 
instances where corporate irresponsibility pays more than corporate 
responsibility.106 Some have pointed to these mixed findings as evidence against 
the existence of green-to-gold opportunities, concluding that the empirical case 
for eco-efficiencies and other sustainability upsides is weak or nonexistent.107 
Others have interpreted these inconsistencies as evidence of pervasive regulatory 
failures that too often allow companies to externalize costs onto society and the 
environment.108 
A growing number of scholars, however, have turned to two alternative 
explanations of these mixed results. First, inconsistent findings may signal that 
some, but not all, ESG factors impact financial performance.109 Sustainability 
leadership can take a myriad of forms, and few scholars expect that it always 
pays to be green. Indeed, it seems highly unlikely that sustainability practices 
would uniformly impact revenue growth, given the breadth of possible 
sustainability practices that can be pursued (e.g., compliance with minimal 
pollution standards versus proactive investments in clean energy technologies) 
and the many different channels by which sustainability can theoretically impact 
earnings (e.g., enhanced operational efficiency versus improved reputation). In 
 
 104.   See, e.g., PETER FLEMING & MARC T. JONES, THE END OF CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: CRISIS & CRITIQUE 4 (2013); ALFRED A. MARCUS, INNOVATIONS IN SUSTAINABILITY: 
FUEL AND FOOD 2 (2015) (arguing that existing green-to-gold opportunities are “narrow and limited”); 
Andrew Crane et al., Contesting the Value of “Creating Shared Value”, 56 CAL. MGMT. REV. 130, 136 
(2014) (“Many corporate decisions related to social and environmental problems, however creative the 
decision-maker may be, do not present themselves as potential win-wins, but rather will manifest 
themselves in terms of dilemmas.”); Peter Dauvergne & Jane Lister, The Prospects and Limits of Eco-
Consumerism: Shopping Our Way to Less Deforestation?, 23 ORG. & ENV’T 132, 146 (2010) (expressing 
skepticism of corporate sustainability’s potential to produce global change); David Vogel, Opportunities 
for and Limitations of Corporate Environmentalism, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW, ECONOMICS, AND BUSINESS 197-202 (Bruce L. 
Hay ed., 2005). 
 105.   See, e.g., James J. Cordeiro & Joseph Sarkis, Environmental Proactivism and Firm 
Performance: Evidence from Security Analyst Earnings Forecasts, 6 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T 104, 104 
(1997); Karen Fisher-Vanden & Karin S. Thorburn, Voluntary Corporate Environmental Initiatives and 
Shareholder Wealth, 62 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 430, 430 (2011); Lars Hassel et al., The Value 
Relevance of Environmental Performance, 14 EUR. ACCT. REV. 41, 41 (2005). 
 106.   See, e.g., Kwang-Ho Kim et al., Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility on 
Corporate Financial Performance: A Competitive-Action Perspective, 44 J. MGMT. 1097, 1097 (2018) 
(finding evidence that socially irresponsible activities improve firm financial performance in certain 
circumstances); Matthew J. Kotchen & Jon Jungbien Moon, Corporate Social Responsibility for 
Irresponsibility 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17254, 2011). 
 107.   See supra note 104. 
 108.   Esty & Cort, supra note 14, at 20. 
 109.   See Albertini, supra note 74, at 432; Endrikat, supra note 85, at 746; Esty & Cort, 
supra note 14, at 21; Orlitzky, supra note 4, at 13. 
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support of this explanation, several meta-analytic studies have identified 
contextual and programmatic factors that mediate the positive effect of corporate 
environmental performance on corporate financial performance.110 
Researchers also point to a variety of methodological inconsistencies as a 
second explanation for the literature’s mixed findings.111 Studies vary widely in 
terms of how they operationalize sustainability, and some variables have a 
stronger theoretical connection to the concept of sustainability than others. The 
rigor of the analyses also fluctuates greatly, with some researchers doing a better 
job than others at accounting for confounding factors and isolating causal 
relationships between environmental and financial performance.112 To this point, 
a recent meta-analysis found that studies that employed less sophisticated models 
underestimated the financial benefits of sustainability leadership due to omitted 
variable bias.113 
Increasingly, scholars have viewed these persisting empirical 
inconsistencies as a call to refine their conceptual and methodological tools, 
rather than to revisit the threshold question of whether sustainability can improve 
financial performance.114 Or, as one reviewer of the literature put it: “we must 
move beyond simply asking ‘Does it pay to be green?’ to ‘When does it pay to 
be green?.’”115 As discussed below in Section II.B, many investors are asking 
similar questions. They are intrigued by the potential of sustainability upsides, 
 
 110.   See, e.g., Albertini, supra note 74, at 440-41 (estimating that the relationship 
between environmental performance and financial performance was strongest when the researchers 
measured environmental performance using environmental management variables, as opposed to 
environmental output or environmental disclosure variables); Orlitzky, supra note 4, at 13 (“The large 
variability of the [sustainability]-[corporate financial performance] relationships suggests several 
moderators (e.g. measurement strategies, industry growth, etc.) which should be examined in future 
research.”). 
 111.   Esty & Cort, supra note 14, at 20-21. 
 112.   See Timo Busch & Volker H. Hoffmann, How Hot Is Your Bottom Line? Linking 
Carbon and Financial Performance, 50 BUS. & SOC’Y 233, 234-35 (2011) (linking inconsistencies in 
findings to inconsistencies in defining and measuring the constructions of “sustainability” and “corporate 
financial performance”); Abagail McWilliams et al., Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategic 
Implications, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 1, 12 (2006) (positing that inconsistencies in the relationships between 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firm financial performance “may be a result of inconsistency in 
defining CSR, inconsistency in defining firm performance, inconsistency in samples, imprecision and 
inconsistency in research design, misspecification of models, changes over time, or some more 
fundamental variance in the samples that are being analyzed”); Orlitzky, supra note 4, at 13 (finding that 
“[t]he large variability of findings in studies is partly due to primary‐study artifacts”—that is, differences 
in data and model specification); Kjetil Telle, “It Pays to Be Green”—A Premature Conclusion, 35 
ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 195, 197 (2006) (discussing the methodological shortcomings of many 
empirical studies of the effects of sustainability on financial performance, including failure to adequately 
address omitted variable bias). 
 113.   Eva Horvathova, Does Environmental Performance Affect Financial 
Performance? A Meta-Analysis, 70 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 52, 56 (2010). On the other hand, studies that 
employed qualitative measures of environmental performance were more likely than quantitative ones to 
produce positive associations between sustainability and financial value. Id. 
 114.   See, e.g., Orlitzky, supra note 4, at 13-14. 
 115.   Dixon-Fowler, supra note 70, at 354; see also Busch & Hoffmann, supra note 112, 
at 234 (echoing this call); Renato J. Orsato, Competitive Environmental Strategies: When Does It Pay to 
be Green?, 48 CAL. MGMT. REV. 127, 127 (2006) (same). 
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but they want more clarity on how sustainability impacts companies’ bottom 
lines and when sustainability leadership pays financial dividends. 
B. Growing Interest in Sustainable Investing 
Sustainable investing is by no means a new phenomenon.116 For decades, a 
small segment of investors have expressed their moral values by excluding 
socially or environmentally “bad” industries from their portfolios.117 Many 
religious groups, for example, have consistently refrained from investing in 
alcohol, gambling, or other so-called “sin” industries.118 More recently, secular 
organizations have begun using divestment as a means of advocating on behalf 
of the environment, civil rights, and other social issues.119 
What is new, however, is sustainability’s move into the mainstream of the 
investment world.120 Until recently, sustainability has been considered a fringe 
issue, appropriate only for those investors who did not care about the financial 
returns on their portfolios.121 But the past decade has witnessed an explosion of 
interest in sustainable investing practices among mainstream investors who 
prioritize strong financial returns.122 For example, the United Nations Principles 
 
 116.   In one of the first recorded instances of socially responsible investing, Quaker 
communities divested from slavery-related industries in the seventeenth century. See EUROSIF, EUROPEAN 
SRI STUDY 8 (2012). 
 117.   See Stewart et al., supra note 14, at 2. 
 118.   ALEXANDER BOERSCH, ALLIANZ GLOBAL INV., DOING GOOD BY INVESTING 
WELL? PENSION FUNDS AND SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT: RESULTS OF AN EXPERT SURVEY 5 
(2010). 
 119.   BOERSCH, supra note 118, at 5 (documenting the use of socially responsible 
investing by the Civil Rights Movement, the environmental movement, and the Anti-Apartheid 
Movement). 
 120.   Clark et al., supra note 12, at 10 (identifying sustainability as “one of the most 
significant trends in financial markets for decades”); Shaheen Contractor & Gregory Elders, Asset Growth 
Speeds ESG Shake Up, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 11, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/asset-growth-speeds-esg-shake (“Environmental, social 
and governance funds are moving beyond their niche market, driven by new funds and an asset growth 
pace that’s picked up in the last few years.”); Alex Davidson, “Sustainable Investing” Goes Mainstream, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sustainable-investing-goes-mainstream-
1452482737 [https://perma.cc/9YCU-L6E2] (noting how mainstream financial firms—such as 
BlackRock and Goldman Sachs—have launched a variety of ESG investment products); Gregory Elders 
& Morgan Tarrant, Sustainable Investing Grows on Asset Owner Demand, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 17, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/sustainable-investing-grows-asset-owner-demand 
(providing detailed data analysis showing that “[s]ustainable investing is moving to broader investment 
analysis from the confines of specialty funds”); Elizabeth Lewis & Ariel Pinchot, Overcoming These 3 
Challenges Can Drive Sustainable Investing into the Mainstream, WORLD RESOURCES INST. (Jan. 4, 
2017), http://www.wri.org/blog/2017/01/overcoming-these-3-challenges-can-drive-sustainable-
investing-mainstream [https://perma.cc/8H49-GKDZ] (“Sustainable investing is ballooning.”). 
 121.   See Esty & Cort, supra note 14, at 13. 
 122.   See EUROSIF, supra note 116, at 7 (reporting evidence “demonstrating the 
continuous appetite by investors to take into account Environmental, Social and Governance factors”); 
Busch et al., supra note 12, at 304; Elyse Douglas et al., Responsible Investing: A Guide to ESG Data 
Providers and Relevant Trends, 8 J. ENVTL. INVESTING 11, 94 (2017); Jody Grewal et al., Market Reaction 
to Mandatory Nonfinancial Disclosure 6 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 16-025, 2015); Sara 
Bernow et al., From “Why” to “Why Not”: Sustainable Investing as the New Normal, MCKINSEY & CO. 
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for Responsible Investment—an initiative launched in 2006 to help investors 
integrate sustainability considerations into their portfolios—has signed on more 
than 1,400 investment organizations who collectively manage about $60 
trillion.123 In another metric of sustainability’s growing popularity, the Global 
Sustainable Investment Alliance (GSIA) reports that nearly $23 trillion of assets 
worldwide are professionally managed under a variety of “responsible 
investment strategies”—up by more than 70% from 2012 levels.124 The United 
States Sustainable Investment Forum (USSIF) reports a similar shift taking place 
in the United States: since 1995, for example, American sustainable investments 
have jumped fourteen-fold, totaling to nearly $9 trillion in 2016.125 
Notably, this investor interest in sustainability shows no signs of abating.126 
Surveys of asset owners and managers consistently find that demand for 
sustainability data is growing.127 Financial experts likewise predict that 
sustainable investment numbers will continue to rise in the future.128 Meanwhile, 
high-profile thought leaders continue to add momentum to the sustainable 
investing movement. For example, the CEO of Blackrock—the world’s largest 




(“Once a niche practice, sustainable investing has become a large and fast-growing major market 
segment.”); Ogechukwu Ezeokoli et al., Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Investment Tools: 
A Review of the Current Field, U.S. DEP’T LABOR 2 (Dec. 2017), 
https://www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation/completed-studies/ESG-Investment-Tools-Review-of-the-Current-
Field.pdf [https://perma.cc/LN9Y-PD4W] (“Interest and participation in ESG investing has increased 
notably in recent years.”); Sustainable Investing: The Millennial Investor, ERNST & YOUNG 1 figs.1, 2 
(2017), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-sustainable-investing-the-millennial-investor-
gl/$FILE/ey-sustainable-investing-the-millennial-investor.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8KE-T254] (showing 
huge recent growth in sustainable investing). 
 123.   Principles for Responsible Investment: An Investor Initiative In Partnership with 
UNEP Finance Initiative and the UN Global Compact, PRINCIPLES RESPONSIBLE INV. 6 (2018), 
https://www.unpri.org/download?ac=6134 [https://perma.cc/7JMH-TJSP]. 
 124.   At the outset of 2012, sustainable investments totaled to $13.3 trillion globally. 
Global Sustainable Investment Review 2014, GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE INV. ALLIANCE 3 (2014), 
http://www.gsi-alliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/GSIA_Review_download.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RW4N-PZCJ]. By 2016, that figure rose to $22.89 trillion. Global Sustainable 
Investment Review 2016, supra note 12, at 3. 
 125.   2016 Trends Report Highlights, supra note 12, at 1. 
 126.   EUROSIF, supra note 116, at 7; George Serafeim & Jody Grewal, ESG Metrics: 
Reshaping Capitalism 1 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 116-037, 2019), 
https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=50871 [https://perma.cc/A66X-MJ6M] (reporting 
that, between November 2010 and April 2011, capital market participants tried accessing ESG metrics 
forty-four million times); Sustainable Investing: The Millennial Investor, supra note 122, at 1 (basing 
predictions of continued sustainable investing growth on the aging of millennials, who tend to “prefer to 
invest in alignment with personal values”). 
 127.   Audrey Choi, Sustainable Investing Enters the Mainstream, MORGAN STANLEY 
(Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/sustainable-investing-enters-mainstream 
[https://perma.cc/BP75-XE8P] (predicting that sustainability investing growth will likely accelerate as 
millennials begin investing more); Sustainable Investing: The Millennial Investor, supra note 122, at 1 
(same). 
 128.   See, e.g., BOERSCH, supra note 118, at 3 (providing results from a survey of 
European pension experts showing that most believe that sustainability criteria “will play an increasingly 
important role in how pension funds make investment decisions” in the future). 
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S&P 500 companies to disclose their sustainability plans to shareholders.129 
Meanwhile, Michael Bloomberg has led calls for companies to more fully 
disclose their climate impacts.130 More telling still has been the investor 
community’s advocacy on behalf of the Paris Agreement, the international 
climate accord signed by 197 countries in December 2015. When President 
Trump announced that he intended to withdraw the United States from the 
agreement, dozens of top executives from a wide array of industries took the 
President to task on Twitter and other social media platforms.131 On the same 
day, more than one hundred companies and investors teamed up with American 
mayors, governors, and university leaders to form the We Are Still In 
campaign—a coalition dedicated to fulfilling the United States’ “nationally 
determined contribution” under the Paris Agreement.132 Today, that number has 
ballooned to more than 1,800 businesses who, together, hold $2.5 trillion in 
assets under management.133 American investors and companies have likewise 
joined forces with their foreign counterparts to voice continued support for the 
international climate framework. In advance of the G20 summit in Hamburg, for 
example, nearly 400 institutional investors, representing more than $22 trillion 
in assets, signed a public letter urging heads of states to follow through on their 
Paris commitments.134    
No one factor explains this remarkable growth of interest in sustainable 
investing. As business scholars have cautioned, today’s sustainability-minded 
 
 129.   See Matt Turner, Here Is the Letter the World’s Largest Investor, BlackRock CEO 
Larry Fink, Just Sent to CEOs Everywhere, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 2, 2016), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/blackrock-ceo-larry-fink-letter-to-sp-500-ceos-2016-2 
[https://perma.cc/R9TK-V62X]. 
 130.   Oliver Ralph, Michael Bloomberg Urges Companies to Reveal Climate Change 
Impact, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/15425194-cefd-11e5-92a1-c5e23ef99c77 
[https://perma.cc/7SKM-Q74X]. 
 131.   See, e.g., Javier E. David, Big Businesses—Even Energy Companies—Disapprove 
of Trump’s Decision to Walk Away from Climate Deal, CNBC (June 2, 2017, 11:05 AM ET), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/01/big-businesses-disapprove-of-trumps-decision-to-walk-away-from-
paris-accord.html [https://perma.cc/Q7GF-Q7AD] (noting how dozens of top executives from an array of 
industries publicly opposed President Trump’s intended withdraw from Paris); Julia Horowitz & Jethro 
Mullen, Top CEOs Tell the CEO President: You’re Wrong on Paris, CNN MONEY (June 2, 2017, 12:43 
PM ET), http://money.cnn.com/2017/06/01/news/ceos-respond-trump-paris-agreement/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/2T4N-C9DV] (same). 
 132.   See Hiroko Tabuchi & Henry Fountain, Bucking Trump, These Cities, States and 
Companies Commit to Paris Accord, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/american-cities-climate-standards.html 
[https://perma.cc/4ZBM-2VCJ]. 
 133.   Mindy Lubber, In Wake of Trump’s Paris Announcement, Investors and 
Companies Show Remarkable Climate Leadership, FORBES (July 7, 2017, 8:55 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mindylubber/2017/07/07/in-wake-of-trumps-paris-announcement-
investors-and-companies-show-remarkable-climate-leadership [https://perma.cc/Z87B-XQFT]. 
 134.   Nicholas Kusnetz, 200+ Investors Tell Trump: Don’t Abandon the Paris Climate 
Accord, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (May 8, 2017), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/08052017/investors-
trump-paris-climate-accord-g7-g20 [https://perma.cc/32YZ-E468]; Letter from Global Investors to 
Governments of the G20 Nations, CERES (July 3, 2017), https://www.ceres.org/news-center/press-
releases/over-200-global-investors-urge-g7-stand-paris-agreement-and-drive-its [https://perma.cc/32YZ-
E468]. 
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investors are not a homogenous group.135 They include both retail investors and 
institutional investors,136 and they run the gamut from individuals, family 
foundations, pension funds, universities, insurance companies, and investment 
banks.137 They are also attracted to sustainability for a variety of reasons.138 
Some, for example, believe that sustainability leaders will outperform the 
market.139 As such, they seek to maximize their financial returns by exploiting 
the profit upsides of sustainability.140 Others, however, view sustainability 
primarily as a business risk that needs to be minimized. These risk-oriented 
investors, in turn, focus on mitigating the downsides of unsustainability through 
strategic divestment plans.141 Still others want better alignment between their 
sustainability values and their portfolios, but they worry that sustainability 
leadership may come at the cost of corporate financial performance. They want 
to bring a sustainability tilt to their portfolio but wish to do so by carefully 
divesting from unsustainable companies and investing in more sustainable 
 
 135.   See Joakim Sandberg, The Heterogeneity of Socially Responsible Investment, 87 
J. BUS. ETHICS 519, 521 (2009) (providing an extensive overview of the variations within the sustainable 
investment community); Ezeokoli et al., supra note 122, at 10 (“Currently, different segments of the 
investing landscape employ different ESG investment strategies.”); Lewis et al., supra note 14, at 9 
(documenting a myriad of different sustainability strategies among mainstream investors).  
 136.   While institutional investors account for the majority of sustainable investing, 
retail investors have increased their share in recent years. In 2014, for example, 13% of sustainable assets 
held in Canada, Europe, and the United States were retail, while 87% were institutional. Two years later, 
26% were retail and 74% were institutional. See Global Sustainable Investment Review 2016, supra note 
12, at 10. According to research analysts, this growth in sustainable investing among retail investors is 
driven by two groups in particular: women and millennials. See Rising Interest in SRI, MACKENZIE INV. 
1 (Oct. 2017), https://www.mackenzieinvestments.com/en/assets/documents/marketingmaterials/mi-
rising-interest-in-sri-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/SWJ3-PZEZ]; see also Inst. for Sustainable Investing, 
Sustainable Signals: New Data from the Individual Investor, MORGAN STANLEY 2 (2017), 
https://www.morganstanley.com/pub/content/dam/msdotcom/ideas/sustainable-
signals/pdf/Sustainable_Signals_Whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ2K-8J96] (noting that “[m]illennial 
investors are nearly twice as likely as the general pool” to invest for ESG reasons and that “women [] lead 
men in their interest in sustainable investing”). 
 137.   See Marc Gunther, Sustainable Investing: Are Companies Finally Moving Money 
Away from Fossil Fuels?, GUARDIAN (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-
business/2015/sep/16/goldman-sachs-morgan-stanley-merrill-lynch-fossil-fuel-divestment 
[https://perma.cc/Y892-2C6U]; Sustainable Investment Joins the Mainstream, ECONOMIST (Nov. 25, 
2017), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/11/25/sustainable-investment-joins-
the-mainstream [https://perma.cc/D6VJ-2S3Z]. This is not to say that all types of investors are equally 
interested in sustainable investing. For example, a recent working paper by economists at UC Davis and 
UC Berkley found that demand for sustainable investing, as compared to more traditional investment 
vehicles, varies significantly across types of institutional investors. See Brad M. Barber et al., Impact 
Investing, CDAR 4 (Jan. 17, 2017), https://cdar.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Impact-
Investing-170117-12font-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9YF-8QF3]. 
 138.   For a helpful typology of today’s sustainability minded investors, see Esty & Cort, 
supra note 14, at 26. 
 139.   See Bernow et al., supra note 122, at 3 (“For many investors, the likelihood that 
sustainable investing produces market-rate returns as effectively as other investments has provided 
convincing grounds to pursue sustainable investment strategies[.]”); Lewis et al., supra note 14, at 2 (“The 
leading driver [of asset owner interest in sustainable investing] is financial in nature: growing evidence of 
the material link between positive ESG performance and corporate financial performance.”); see also Esty 
& Cort, supra note 14, at 26 (offering a taxonomy of sustainability-minded investors). 
 140.   Busch et al., supra note 12, at 312. 
 141.   Bernow et al., supra note 122, at 3; Lewis et al., supra note 14, at 10 fig.4. 
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ones—while maintaining appropriate asset-class diversity and minimizing 
tracking error against investment strategy benchmarks.142 
Despite this heterogeneity, two main differences emerge between today’s 
sustainability-minded mainstream investors and the socially responsible 
investors of the past. First, mainstream investors care about their portfolio 
returns. While socially responsible investors were willing to pursue their values 
without regard to the impact on their portfolios’ value, mainstream investors 
want to maintain robust returns even as they align their investments with 
sustainability principles.143 To be sure, many mainstream investors appear ready 
to sacrifice some profits in exchange for a more sustainable portfolio.144 But even 
these investors care about the link between sustainability and corporate financial 
performance, as they want to carefully calibrate their portfolios to yield a desired 
mix of sustainability and financial returns.145 Second, mainstream investors 
 
 142.   There are, of course, other types of sustainability-minded investors. For example, 
some may seek to improve corporate sustainability through shareholder activism, rather than by simply 
redirecting their investments from unsustainable to sustainable companies. See Busch et al., supra note 
12, at 313; Steve Waygood, How Do the Capital Markets Undermine Sustainable Development? What 
Can Be Done to Correct This?, 1 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 81, 81 (20111) (identifying investor 
advocacy as one of the primary routes by which capital markets can influence corporate sustainability). 
 143.   See Esty & Cort, supra note 14, at 23 (distinguishing mainstream investors from 
socially responsible investors); Amir Amel-Zadeh & George Serafeim, Why and How Investors Use ESG 
Information: Evidence from a Global Survey, FIN. ANALYSTS J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 4), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2925310 [https://perma.cc/K958-7G3S] (finding 
evidence in a global survey of 413 senior investment professionals that “the use of ESG information has 
primarily financial rather than ethical motives”); Bernow et al., supra note 122, at 2 (noting that “newer 
[sustainable investment] strategies typically put less emphasis on ethical concerns and are designed 
instead to achieve a conventional investment aim: maximizing risk-adjusted returns”); Davidson, supra 
note 120 (observing that BlackRock’s Impact U.S. Equity Fund—an ESG fund launched in October of 
2015—had already attracted $20 million in assets by January of 2016); Mark Fulton et al., Sustainable 
Investing: Establishing Long-Term Value and Performance, DEUTSCHE BANK GROUP 21 (June 2012), 
https://www.db.com/cr/en/docs/Sustainable_Investing_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UBG-SE7F] (“The 
most modern wave of Sustainable Investors . . . seek a sustained competitive advantage and 
outperformance, partly by evaluating a company’s overall management ability to adapt to a dynamic 
business climate and create enduring value.”); Fiona Reynolds, Mainstream Slow to Accept Benefits of 
Responsible Investment, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/a8e2d2c6-69b8-11e4-
8f4f-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/6JLS-XSKB] (reporting that concerns about financial returns are a 
major impediment to mainstream investors’ adoption of sustainability strategies). 
 144.   Esty & Cort, supra note 14, at 25-26; see also BOERSCH, supra note 118, at 3 
(survey of pension experts reporting that “the growing [socially responsible investment] trend is being 
driven much less by the expectation of higher returns or lower risk as it is by public pressure”); Bernow 
et al., supra note 122, at 3 (observing that some mainstream institutional investors adopt sustainable 
investing practices in response to demands from fund beneficiaries who prioritize sustainability values). 
 145.   Douglas, supra note 122, at 103 (observing that investors are primarily concerned 
with sustainability “issues that are material to financial performance”); Mozaffar Khan et al., Corporate 
Sustainability: First Evidence on Materiality 2 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 15-073, 2015), 
https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/corporate-sustainability-first-evidence-on-materiality 
[https://perma.cc/DH74-TP6U] (noting that investors’ strategies for integrating ESG factors into their 
portfolios depend heavily on the materiality of those factors to corporate financial performance); Ezeokoli 
et al., supra note 122, at 11 (“One of the most common critiques of ESG investing is the difficulty for 
investors to correctly identify, and appropriately weigh, ESG factors in investment selection.”); 
Tomorrow’s Investment Rules 2.0, ERNST & YOUNG 12 (2015), 
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-ccass-institutional-investor-survey-2015/$FILE/ey-
ccass-institutional-investor-survey-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2HV-HL7T]. 
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diverge in their methods of integrating sustainability objectives into their 
portfolios. As noted above, socially responsible investors focus primarily on 
screening out bad actors.146 Because their screening criteria are often based on 
purely nonfinancial considerations, such as a moral aversion to guns or 
gambling, this investment strategy will often exclude entire industries.147 
Mainstream investors, in contrast, prefer a more structured approach that will 
enable them to balance their sustainability objectives against their financial 
priorities. As such, many seek to bring a sustainability tilt to their portfolio by 
strategically divesting from unsustainable companies and investing in 
sustainable ones.148 
As discussed in the following Section, these differences hold important 
ramifications for the design of environmental information regulation. The 
current set of sustainability disclosure regimes—both mandatory and 
voluntary—cater to the informational needs of socially responsible investors, not 
mainstream investors. Following in the tradition of environmental information 
 
 146.   See supra note 117-119 and accompanying text. 
 147.   Fulton et al., supra note 143, at 20. 
 148.   See Jeroen Derwall et al., A Tale of Values-Driven and Profit-Seeking Social 
Investors, 35 J. BANKING & FIN. 2137, 2138 (2011) (“[M]ost SRI [socially responsible investment] funds 
reflect a hybrid of negative and positive social responsibility screens”); Amel-Zadeh & Serafeim, supra 
note 143, at 1 (finding that investment professionals perceive negative screening ESG strategies as less 
beneficial than full integration strategies); Michael Baldinger & Christopher Greenwald, Long-Term 






[https://perma.cc/7CKV-XUGL] (arguing for sustainable investing to move beyond “negative screening” 
strategies, which cannot satisfy mainstream investors preferences for screening procedures that provide 
“additional, value-adding insights into the long-term risks and opportunities of companies”); Bernow et 
al., supra note 122, at 2-3 (documenting how sustainable investment strategies are moving away from 
pure negative screening and toward “ESG integration, which is the systematic and explicit inclusion of 
ESG factors in financial analysis”); Davidson, supra note 120 (noting a shift in the sustainable investment 
community from using negative screens to “eliminate whole sectors” to using more tailored ESG 
investment strategies to “judge companies individually”); Fulton et al., supra note 143, at 20-21 (tracing 
the evolution of sustainable investing from purely negative screening to value-enhancing investment 
strategies); In Unprecedented Response, Investors Call on SEC to Improve Reporting of Climate Risks 
and Other Sustainability Challenges, CERES (July 20, 2016), https://www.ceres.org/news-center/press-
releases/unprecedented-response-investors-call-sec-improve-reporting-climate [https://perma.cc/A8R6-
QK6T] (“We look to the SEC to require the corporate reporting investors need to both assess risk and 
opportunity brought by climate change.” (quoting Anne Simpson, Investment Director at the California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System, the largest public pension fund in the United States (emphasis 
added))); Lewis et al., supra note 14 (presenting the results of a survey of asset owners showing that about 
a fifth employ positive sustainability screens, the most common being climate-related investment screens); 
Performing for the Future: ESG’s Place in Investment Portfolios, STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS 9 (2017), 
https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/2017/esg-institutional-
investor-survey-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YJ7-5YMJ] (providing survey results indicating that “many 
investors have moved beyond negative screening and now employ other ESG strategies within a broader 
approach”); Stewart et al., supra note 14, at 11-12 (including a survey of large investors showing that, 
among those who adopted sustainability strategies, more than half used sustainability factors to screen in 
investments). 
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regulation more generally, they create a series of red lights that spotlight 
sustainability laggards—facilitating “negative screening” by broader industry 
categories and subpar company performance. But they do not create a companion 
set of green lights capable of guiding profit-minded investors toward 
sustainability leaders. As a result of this information deficit, implementation of 
sustainability investing practices has lagged behind mainstream investors’ 
interest in sustainability. 
C. Informational Barriers to Sustainable Investing 
Despite sustainability’s remarkable move into the mainstream, scholars and 
industry analysts generally agree that investor interest in sustainability has 
outstripped their adoption and integration of sustainable investment practices.149 
Accounting for sustainability factors in portfolio design continues to be the 
exception, rather than the rule. In the United States, for instance, sustainable 
investments—if construed very broadly—account for about a fifth of total assets 
under management.150 Likewise, a survey of more than 1,100 large asset owners 
revealed that less than a quarter incorporated sustainability strategies in their 
investment policies.151 Even among investors who consider sustainability to be 
relevant to their portfolios, few have systematically integrated sustainability 
factors into their investment decisionmaking process.152 Rarely do asset owners 
 
 149.   See, e.g., Friede et al., supra note 16, at 210-11; Falko Paetzold & Timo Busch, 
Unleashing the Powerful Few: Sustainable Investing Behaviour of Wealthy Private Investors, 27 ORG. & 
ENV’T 347, 348 (2014) (commenting that “[f]or private investors there seems to be a dichotomy between 
interest in SI [sustainable investing] and actual engagement in SI”); Jonathan Bailey et al., Sustaining 
Sustainability: What Institutional Investors Should Do Next on ESG, MCKINSEY & CO. 1 (2016), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/private-equity-and-principal-investors/our-insights/sustaining-
sustainability-what-institutional-investors-should-do-next-on-esg [https://perma.cc/6FAL-PZPP] (“[I]t’s 
clear that many investors have struggled to convert their commitment [to sustainable investing] into 
practice.”); Lewis et al., supra note 14, at 4 (“Despite the promise, only a small proportion of these 
investors’ assets are managed under sustainable investing practices.”). 
 150.   Global Sustainable Investment Review 2016, supra note 12, at 7 tbl.2 (showing in 
Table 2 that sustainable investments accounted for 21.6% of total managed assets in the United States in 
2016); see also Rebecca O’Neill, Closing the Sustainability-Investor Relations Gap, SUSTAINABILITY 12 
(2016), https://sustainability.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/SA-ES-Report-Web-Spreads.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7G93-DR8N] (“According to a 2014 Nasdaq Advisory Services study of 500 publicly 
traded companies, barely one-fifth of US companies were integrating sustainability into their investor 
communications.”). 
 151.   Stewart et al., supra note 14, at 3; see also Council on Found. & Commonfund 
Inst., Council on Foundations—Commonfund Study of Responsible Investing: Foundations Survey 2016, 
COMMONFUND 2 (June 2016), https://www.commonfund.org/wp-content/uploads/News-and-
Research/02-Whitepapers-PremiumContent/CCSF-Responsible-Investing-Survey/2016-06-CF-Study-
of-Responsible-Investing.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QCS-VP8W] (showing that in a 2014 survey of large 
foundations representing $39.7 billion in endowment assets, only about a quarter report that their 
investment policy statement permitted or referred to responsible investing); Tomorrow’s Investment Rules 
2.00, supra note 145, at 7 fig. E.1 (finding that only about a third of the two hundred institutional investors 
surveyed in 2015 used “structured, systematic methods to evaluate ESG [factors]”). 
 152.   See Bernow et al., supra note 122, at 9 (observing that only “[a] few funds have 
begun to systematically assess how their entire portfolios are exposed to material ESG risks (notably, 
climate change and energy consumption)”); A Blueprint for Responsible Investment: Genesis, 
Assumptions, and Process, PRINCIPLES RESPONSIBLE INVESTING 16, 
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move beyond high-level conversations about sustainability to build out specific 
sustainability strategies, and few investment professionals put sustainability 
principles into practice on a regular basis.153 
What explains this gap between interest and implementation? Although 
there are several contributors, as discussed below, the chief culprit is a dearth of 
reliable sustainability metrics and data that materially relate to corporate 
financial performance. In survey after survey, investors and analysts report that 
they do not have the information necessary to operationalize their interests in 
bringing a sustainability lens to their investment decisions.154 Research 
conducted by scholars and industry experts has similarly confirmed that 
limitations in existing sustainability data act as a key barrier to the adoption of 
sustainable investing practices by mainstream investors.155 Moreover, this ESG 
 
https://www.unpri.org/download?ac=1919 [https://perma.cc/5J9R-95Y5] [hereinafter Blueprint for 
Responsible Investment] (finding that, among investment managers, “systemic and truly insightful 
incorporation of ESG issues across a firm’s entire spectrum of assets is still relatively rare”); Reynolds, 
supra note 143. 
 153.   See Bailey et al., supra note 149, at 1-2 (“While ESG and corporate-governance 
teams are commonplace, they are often held at arm’s length from core investment activities.”); Blueprint 
for Responsible Investment, supra note 152, at 38 (2017) (finding that the majority of PRI signatories “do 
not regularly consider climate change as a factor in their investment policy or decisionmaking”); Friede 
et al., supra note 16, at 211 (reporting that “just about 10% of global professionals receive formal training 
on how to consider ESG criteria in investment analysis”). 
 154.   For example, based on interviews with more than one hundred asset owners and 
investment professionals, a 2016 report by the World Resources Institute identified limitations in 
sustainability data as a key barrier to the adoption of sustainable investing practices by mainstream 
investors. See Lewis et al., supra note 14, at 3 (“While reams of ESG data exist, key limitations restrict 
their broader use in mainstream investment decision making.”). A 2016 survey of large foundations, as 
well as a 2012 survey of asset owners and a 2012 survey of investment professionals, reached similar 
conclusions. See Council on Founds. & Commonfund Inst., supra note 151, at 13 (2016) (“One of the 
more urgent issues confronting those trying to develop their integration of ESG factors is the relative 
dearth of reliable metrics by which to measure progress.”); Stewart et al., supra note 14, at 16; Michael 
Sadowski, Rate the Raters Phase Five: The Investor View, SUSTAINABILITY (Nov. 2012), 
https://sustainability.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/rtr_phase5_investor_view.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A7TZ-3WSV]. 
 155.   See, e.g., Busch et al., supra note 12, at 304-05 (identifying the lack of trustworthy 
ESG data as a major barrier to sustainable investing); Danielle Chesebrough et al., 2016 Report on 
Progress, SUSTAINABLE STOCK EXCHANGES 29 (2016), 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/unctad_sse_2016d1.pdf [https://perma.cc/22EF-MAQD] 
(“[T]he current state of ESG disclosure is not sufficient for investor needs.”); Exploring ESG: A 
Practitioner’s Perspective, BLACKROCK 8 (June 2016), 
https://www.blackrock.com/investing/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-exploring-esg-a-practitioners-
perspective-june-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/65XV-8EZC] (“There is a need for comprehensive, 
standardized, and comparable data to accurately measure how companies are managing relevant ESG 
issues.”); Laura Gitman et al., ESG in the Mainstream: The Role for Companies and Investors in 
Environmental, Social, and Governance Integration, BSR 20 (2009), 
https://www.bsr.org/reports/BSR%20ESG%20Integration%20Report%20_Sept%202009_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WT5W-SR59] (“The lack of consistent and comparable ESG data has been one of the 
most substantial and pervasive barriers to ESG integration.”); Lewis et al., supra note 14, at 3 (“ESG data, 
disclosure standards, and performance metrics are inadequate.”); Lewis & Pinchot, supra note 120 
(identifying poor ESG data quality as a major barrier to continued growth in sustainable investing); Rory 
Sullivan et al., Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century, UNEP FIN. INITIATIVE 9 (2014), 
https://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/fiduciary_duty_21st_century.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5ZN-
JZGZ] (identifying as a major challenge “[i]nconsistency in corporate reporting, including inadequate 
analysis of the financial materiality of ESG issues, making it hard to assess investment implications”); 
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data problem exacerbates other commonly cited barriers to sustainable 
investment growth. For example, studies suggest that many mainstream 
investors are reluctant to engage in sustainable investing without more robust 
estimates of the effects of corporate sustainability initiatives on company 
profits.156 However, as noted above, some of this empirical uncertainty can be 
traced to problems with the quality and methodologies of the underlying 
sustainability data.157 Addressing the sustainability metrics problem could 
therefore help remove this second obstacle to sustainable investing by enabling 
academics to more accurately model the relationship between ESG performance 
and financial performance. Better sustainability data would also likely help 
alleviate two other widely discussed barriers, namely: (1) investors’ lack of 
familiarity with ESG issues, and (2) institutional investors’ concerns that 
sustainable investing conflicts with their fiduciary duties to their clients.158 As to 
the first, it borders on tautological to note that investors’ knowledge of ESG 
issues depends on their access to ESG information. Accordingly, making 
sustainability data more useable and more relevant to mainstream investors will 
help increase the investor community’s exposure to, and understanding of, 
sustainable investing. For similar reasons, better sustainability data may help 
lessen investors’ fiduciary duty concerns, which primarily stem from the belief 
that asset owners and advisers cannot take into account ESG factors when they 
make investment decisions because they have a legal obligation to maximize 
portfolio returns.159 To begin, such concerns are often overstated, as fiduciary 
duty laws in many countries, including the United States, allow institutional 
investors to integrate ESG considerations into their portfolios.160 That said, 
improvements in sustainability data can help mitigate these concerns by 
clarifying the profit upsides to corporate sustainability and by empowering 
investors to better manage any trade-offs between sustainability and financial 
returns. Thus, solving the sustainability data problem promises not only to 
remove a major obstacle to sustainable investing, but also to help mitigate a 
number of other barriers that are currently impeding the adoption of ESG 
investment practices. 
 
Tomorrow’s Investment Rules 2.0, supra note 145, at 19 (“Investors say repeatedly that they do not receive 
enough accurate, standardized nonfinancial [ESG] information relevant to companies’ risk and 
performance assessment.”).  
 156.   See, e.g., Lewis et al., supra note 14, at 3. 
 157.   See supra notes 111-115. 
 158.   See Sullivan et al., supra note 155, at 16. 
 159.   Id. 
 160.   See id. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Labor released an Interpretive Bulletin (IB 
2015-01) in October 2015 that expressly notified fiduciaries of retirement pension plans that they may 
consider ESG factors without violating their fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA). See Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard under ERISA in 
Considering Economically Targeted Investments, 80 Fed. Reg. 65135, 65136 (Oct. 26, 2015) (“[T]he 
Department does not believe ERISA prohibits a fiduciary from . . . incorporating ESG factors in 
investment policy statements or integrating ESG-related tools, metrics, and analyses to evaluate an 
investment’s risk or return or choose among otherwise equivalent investments.”). 
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Admittedly, the idea that investors need more sustainability metrics appears 
counterintuitive at first glance, given that the sustainability metrics industry has 
boomed in recent years. For example, the global number of reporting instruments 
that either require or encourage disclosure of sustainability related information 
has grown from 19 in 2006 to nearly 400 in 2016.161 Presently, about 95% of the 
250 largest companies globally162 issue sustainability reports, as do 75% of S&P 
500 companies.163 Numerous data providers have, in turn, synthesized and 
packaged this information into hundreds of different sustainability metrics that 
“score” corporations on a variety of different sustainability-focused 
dimensions.164 
A closer examination, however, reveals two problems with existing 
sustainability metrics that limit their usefulness to mainstream investors—the 
first pertaining to what they measure, the second pertaining to how they measure 
it. Regarding the former, today’s metrics largely follow the design and logic of 
traditional environmental information regulation.165 That is, they are built to 
spotlight sustainability laggards, but not sustainability leaders.166 As Professors 
Daniel Esty and Todd Cort note in their careful survey of existing sustainability 
metrics, most ESG frameworks focus on sustainability risks and downsides.167 
 
 161.   Wim Bartels et al., Carrots & Sticks: Global Trends in Sustainability Reporting 
Regulation and Policy, KPMG 9 (2016), https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/05/carrots-and-
sticks-may-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/BWB4-TPPH]. This study defined sustainability reporting 
instruments to include both government disclosure regulations or policies and NGO-published disclosure 
standards, guidance, and recommendations. Id. at 8. 
 162.   Ernst & Young & B.C. Ctr. for Corp. Citizenship, Value of Sustainability 
Reporting, ERNST & YOUNG 2 (2016), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_-
_Value_of_sustainability_reporting/$FILE/EY-Value-of-Sustainability-Reporting.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZKY4-PZAK]. 
 163.   Eric Nitzberg, The Wild West of Measuring Corporate Sustainability, STAN. SOC. 
INNOVATION REV. (Jan. 27, 2016), 
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_wild_west_of_measuring_corporate_sustainability 
[https://perma.cc/MNB3-T4HE]. 
 164.   Leading sustainability data providers include: MSCI, Bloomberg, and Thomson 
Reuters. See Esty & Cort, supra note 14, at 21-23. For a review of sustainability data providers and 
sustainability data products, see Douglas, supra note 122, at 94-100; and Betty Moy Huber & Michael 
Comstock, ESG Reports and Ratings: What They Are, Why They Matter, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 27, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/27/esg-reports-and-
ratings-what-they-are-why-they-matter [https://perma.cc/8QBW-HY9Z]. 
 165.   See Diana Glassman et al., The Missing Metrics That Matter to Investors: How 
Companies Can Develop ESG Financial Value Creation Metrics, 8 J. ENVTL. INVESTING 206, 215 (2017) 
(“For the most part, traditional social and environmental metrics are designed to measure the societal 
value—beyond economic growth and jobs—that companies produce. However, traditional ESG metrics 
are less useful for investors whose primary need is to determine if a company’s ESG performance 
increases, decreases, or has minimal impact on its current and future financial performance.”). 
 166.   See Glassman, supra note 165, at 216 (“Mainstream investors have primarily used 
ESG metrics as indicators of risk, highlighting governance weaknesses and the potential environmental 
and social controversies that can arise from governance failures. Because they were not designed to 
measure financial value, ESG metrics have proven ill-suited to helping investors discern the financial 
impact of companies’ ESG performance.”); Lewis et al., supra note 14, at 36 (concluding that 
sustainability metrics are often “backward-looking and risk-focused,” which limits their usefulness to 
mainstream investors). 
 167.   Esty & Cort, supra note 14, at 29-31. 
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Few seek to capture the potential profit upsides to sustainability leadership—
such as when companies position themselves to thrive by providing energy 
efficient products that will command increasing market share in a world with 
more widespread carbon pricing.168 As a result, they miss a key factor that 
distinguishes sustainability leaders from the pack: their efforts to make 
sustainability a driver of financial success. 
Moreover, the current data are not tightly focused on sustainability factors 
that materially relate to financial performance. Too often, they are based on a 
firm’s past reputation on sustainability issues (as often measured by negative 
media reports) rather than its current or future sustainability operations.169 Thus, 
for example, existing sustainability scorecards might flag Dow Chemical (now 
Dow DuPont) as an environmental laggard for its long history of problematic 
pollution practices but fail to recognize the company’s recent move to integrate 
sustainability into its core business model.170 While a socially responsible 
investor might care about the former, mainstream investors will be more 
interested in the latter. That is, they want forward-looking metrics that track 
sustainability strategies that can potentially deliver future financial growth.171 In 
line, however, with the red-lights model of environmental information 
regulation, many of today’s sustainability metrics have not been designed with 
financial value in mind.172 Rather, they seek to identify sustainability laggards 
 
 168.   See Douglas, supra note 122, at 107 (discussing the investment community’s need 
for forward-looking metrics to identify future sustainability risks and opportunities). This omission is 
somewhat surprising given that several scholars have proposed frameworks for measuring sustainability 
growth opportunities. E.g., Steve Lydenberg et al., From Transparency to Performance: Industry-Based 
Sustainability Reporting on Key Issues, INITIATIVE RESPONSIBLE INV. 24-25 (2010), 
[https://perma.cc/GZF6-KZ7J] (explaining the methodology behind sustainability “innovation 
indicators”); Glassman, supra note 165, at 217-23 (proposing a framework for ESG value creation 
metrics). 
 169.   See Aaron K. Chatterji et al., How Well Do Social Ratings Actually Measure 
Corporate Social Responsibility?, 18 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 125, 125 (2009) (finding that KDL’s 
sustainability metrics were predictive of past environmental performance but not future environmental 
performance); Maria Egan, ESG Is Incomplete: An Investor’s Perspective, GREENBIZ (Sept. 6, 2017, 1:40 
AM), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/esg-incomplete-investors-perspective [https://perma.cc/G86A-
RAUF] (observing that ESG data look backward, while investors want to know how ESG factors “will 
affect the company and its financial performance in the future”); Lewis et al., supra note 14, at 36 
(“[O]ften, the orientation of the analysis is backward-looking and risk-focused. This perspective means 
that the analyses offer limited insight on the positive ESG impact of potential investments, which was 
identified as important by a number of participants.”); Directorate-Gen. for Justice & Consumers, 
Summary of the Responses to the Public Consultation on Long-term and Sustainable Investment, EUR. 
COMM’N 19 (2016), http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2016-
44/feedback_final_pc_30068_en_19173.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZE2-5UZY] (reporting that “most ESG 
research focu[s]ed on processes and consisted of short-term and backward looking indicators”). 
 170.   Esty & Cort, supra note 14, at 30. 
 171.   World Bus. Council for Sustainable Dev. & UNEP Fin. Initiative, Translating ESG 
into Sustainable Business Value: Key Insights for Companies and Investors, UNEP FIN. INITIATIVE 11 
(Mar. 2010), https://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/translatingESG.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XHA-
FYC7] (reporting that asset managers want forward-looking ESG metrics). 
 172.   See Cohen, supra note 7, at 10427 (“Current government-mandated disclosure 
programs tend to ignore indicators of future environmental performance such as the existence of sound 
environmental management practices, environmental research and development, new management and/or 
new initiatives designed to improve environmental performance, etc. However, these indicators tend to 
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across a dizzyingly vast array of sustainability dimensions, only a few of which 
are material to corporate financial performance.173 As a result, existing 
sustainability metrics—with their focus on sustainability laggards and their lack 
of focus on business fundamentals—often fail to satisfy the information needs 
of mainstream investors.174 
Put simply, mainstream investors need more green-light sustainability 
metrics that are keyed to the identifying characteristics of sustainability leaders. 
These metrics might track, for example, the share of revenue that a company 
derives from selling sustainable products or services, the amount of cost savings 
generated from a firm’s eco-efficiency initiatives, and the level of investment 
that a company sinks into clean technology research and development. These 
types of measures would help distinguish leading companies who seek to make 
sustainability a core driver of revenue growth from those who merely work to 
mitigate the risks of sustainability at the margins.175 
In a similar vein, green-light metrics should also focus investors’ attention 
on the degree to which firms are integrating sustainability considerations into 
their operational practices and business strategies. Such measures might include, 
inter alia, whether the company’s board has approved a sustainability action plan, 
created a centralized sustainability team for coordinating and implementing that 
plan, implemented internal incentives to encourage sustainability thinking by its 
decisionmakers (e.g., tying executive bonuses to sustainability targets or using 
an internal carbon price when making investment decisions), and established 
internal mechanisms to monitor progress on sustainability objectives. While 
these types of disclosures would provide key information on how sustainability 
considerations factor into a company’s everyday operations, it is also important 
to develop green-light metrics that capture a company’s future sustainability 
plans. Such forward-looking measures might include, for example, a company’s 
 
be used by private ratings organizations, e.g., Innovest, SAM Sustainability Group, as important predictors 
of future performance.”). 
 173.   A recent study of ninety-four Canadian companies found, for example, that these 
corporate sustainability reports contained as many as 585 different indicators of sustainability 
performance, with little overlap. This diversity of sustainability metrics speaks to the system’s lack of 
focus on material issues and data comparability that makes benchmarking possible. See Laurence Clement 
Roca & Cory Searcy, An Analysis of Indicators Disclosed in Corporate Sustainability Reports, 20 J. 
CLEANER PRODUCTION 103, 103 (2012); see also Lydenberg et al., supra note 168, at 9 (discussing a 
PricewaterhouseCoopers analysis of corporate sustainability reports that found that “because companies 
take varying approaches to CSR reporting, it can be challenging to assess companies’ actual performance, 
or to gauge their efforts in comparison to one another”). 
 174.   See Sustainability Disclosure: Getting Ahead of the Curve, DELOITTE 5 (2016), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/risk/us-risk-sustainability-disclosure.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NAQ6-CC9C] (reviewing survey data showing that “over 80 percent of investors are 
dissatisfied by how ESG risks and opportunities are identified and quantified in financial terms” (internal 
quotations omitted)); Tomorrow’s Investment Rules 2.00, supra note 145, at 22-23 (attributing 
institutional investors’ current dissatisfaction with ESG data to the fact that these data are not designed to 
serve the needs of investors). 
 175.   Lubin & Esty, supra note 79, at 4 (discussing the need for a value-driver ESG 
disclosure framework that tracks sustainability-driven revenue growth, productivity, and risk). 
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future revenue projections for sustainable products and services, as well as a 
company’s own internal targets for reducing pollution, energy, and waste.176 
Expanding the array of sustainability green lights, however, would only 
solve part of the problem. Sustainability metrics are only as useful to investors 
as they are trustworthy, and today’s sustainability scorecards suffer from several 
methodological problems that severely undermine investor confidence in the 
data’s accuracy.177 First, the reporting coverage for any given sustainability 
metric remains small, in large part because most sustainability measures are 
based on self-reported, voluntarily disclosed data.178 For example, only about 
two percent of companies worldwide report their greenhouse gas emissions to 
the Carbon Disclosure Project, one of the most widely used climate-related 
disclosure programs for companies.179 Likewise, the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI)—the largest voluntary reporting regime for sustainability—contained data 
on less than 1,400 companies in 2015, which amounts to less than two percent 
of publicly traded companies worldwide.180 Moreover, because firms are free to 
pick and choose which metrics to disclose, reporting rates for any single GRI 
metric are even lower.181 This inconsistency in coverage impedes investors’ 
ability to meaningfully compare sustainability performance across broad swaths 
of their portfolios.182 
 
 176.   Notably a company’s incentives to overstate its future sustainability gains would 
likely be tempered by the financial penalties that it would risk from failing to meet its targets. Furthermore, 
investors could assess the reliability of a company’s future sustainability targets by cross-referencing them 
against metrics concerning the company’s current sustainability operations, practices, and management. 
Ambitious sustainability predictions that are not supported by present-day investments in sustainability 
practices and procedures would raise red flags for investors looking to bet on tomorrow’s sustainability 
leaders. 
 177.   See Chatterji et al., supra note 169, at 125 (finding that the “environmental 
strengths” metrics of a prominent sustainability data provider are poor predictors of actual environmental 
performance); Exploring ESG, supra note 155, at 8; Gitman et al., supra note 155, at 20 (“The lack of 
specific mandated disclosures means that even among leading corporate responsibility/sustainability 
reports, the data are likely to vary on issues covered and methods for measurement.”). 
 178.   Esty & Cort, supra note 14, at 34; Lewis et. al., supra note 14, at 37 (observing 
that most sustainability metrics are based on voluntary self-disclosure by companies); Morrow & Yow, 
supra note 12, at 5 (finding that “the world’s large listed companies—essentially the complete set of global 
mid- and large-cap equities—are failing to disclose their performance on seven basic sustainability 
metrics”). For a detailed discussion of why voluntary disclosure regimes result in the under-reporting of 
sustainability information, see infra Section III.A. 
 179.   Esty & Cort, supra note 14, at 36; see also CDP-SDSB Response to BIS: 
Publication of Draft Regulations for Narrative Reporting, CLIMATE DISCLOSURE STANDARDS BD. 2 
(Nov. 2012), https://www.cdsb.net/sites/cdsbnet/files/cdp-cdsb_joint_consultation_response_-
_bis_narrative_reporting_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZH5-QS4B] (“CDP now holds the largest collection 
globally of primary climate change and water data . . . .”). 
 180.   Esty & Cort, supra note 14, at 36. 
 181.   Id. at 36-37; see also Douglas, supra note 122, at 104 (discussing how voluntary 
reporting leads to selective ESG disclosures). 
 182.   See Lewis et. al., supra note 14, at 35; Sustainability Goes Mainstream: Insights 
into Investor Views, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 8 (May 2014), https://businessfacilities.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/pwc-sustainability-goes-mainstream-investor-views.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2MRQ-LVGZ] (reporting that nearly eighty percent of surveyed institutional investors 
were dissatisfied by the “comparability of sustainability reporting between companies in the same 
industry”); Tomorrow’s Investment Rules 2.00, supra note 145, at 24 (“Survey data indicates that investors 
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The absence of consistent and transparent methodological standards for 
collecting and preparing sustainability data further undermines investor 
confidence.183 For example, data providers vary in how they address missing 
data: some use statistical techniques—such as averaging—to impute values to 
nonresponses, while others replace missing data with low scores in order to 
penalize companies for failing to disclose.184 Likewise, they differ in the 
frequency with which they update their sustainability data, meaning that one 
metric might correspond to 2017 data while another refers to 2005 data.185 
Scholars and investors have also criticized existing sustainability metrics for 
failing to consistently normalize the underlying data with respect to key company 
characteristics, preventing “apples-to-apples” comparisons across firms.186 At 
the same time, the fact that third-party verification of self-reported sustainability 
data remains a minority practice breeds further distrust.187 Together, these 
methodological inconsistencies have worked to reduce investors’ confidence 
in—and use of—sustainability metrics.188 
 
are especially eager to measure a company’s nonfinancial performance against that of its sector peers and 
to link a company’s nonfinancial information to its expected performance.”). 
 183.   Douglas, supra note 122, at 103 (identifying methodological inconsistencies as “a 
major data quality challenge” for sustainability metrics); Daniel C. Matisoff et al., Convergence in 
Environmental Reporting: Assessing the Carbon Disclosure Project, 22 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T 285, 
296 (2013) (documenting how changes in the Carbon Disclosure Project’s survey of corporate greenhouse 
emissions hampers comparative analyses over time); Lewis et. al., supra note 14, at 3 (identifying 
inconsistencies across sustainability indicators as a major impediment to sustainable investment growth); 
Sustainability Disclosure: Getting Ahead of the Curve, supra note 174, at 5 (“Complicating matters 
further, sustainability reporting and disclosure, in many cases, currently lacks the discipline of established 
management systems, processes, and controls exhibited by financial reporting.”). 
 184.   Esty & Cort, supra note 14, at 3; see also Timothy M. Doyle, Ratings that Don’t 
Rate: The Subjective World of ESG Ratings Agencies, AM. COUNCIL FOR CAPITAL FORMATION 8-9 (July 
2018), http://accfcorpgov.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ACCF_RatingsESGReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P4P7-HNV2] (highlighting the absence of standardized methodologies for producing 
ESG data). 
 185.   See Morrow & Yow, supra note 12, at 7 (recommending that “policymakers take 
the necessary steps to minimize the time gap between companies’ financial and sustainability reporting 
cycles”). 
 186.   Larger companies, for example, tend to pollute more in the aggregate, even though 
they might have lower emissions per output than their smaller counterparts. See Busch et al., supra note 
12, at 316 (observing that sustainability information “is not very standardized and harmonized, which 
makes its interpretation for investment decision makers even more difficult”); Esty & Cort, supra note 
14, at 37-38; Doyle, supra note 184, at 9-12 (discussing company-size, geographic, and industry biases in 
ESG metrics); Tomorrow’s Investment Rules 2.00, supra note 145, at 25 (“Investors consistently affirm 
their desire for disclosures [on ESG factors] that allow the apples-to-apples comparison of companies, but 
lament the fact that conducting such comparisons is often difficult and time consuming.”). 
 187.   See Davidson, supra note 120 (identifying distrust of sustainability data as a key 
hurdle to the sustainable investment movement); The KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility 
Reporting 2013, KPMG INT’L 33 (Dec. 2013), 
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2015/08/kpmg-survey-of-corporate-responsibility-reporting-
2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/NKN8-Z2GN] (finding that rates of assurance among the 100 largest 
companies in 41 countries were less than 50%). 
 188.   Sadowski, supra note 154, at 10, 12 (finding in a survey of one thousand 
investment professionals that only forty percent were “very” or extremely” satisfied with existing 
sustainability metrics, while nearly half recommended that data providers improve the transparency of 
their metric’s methodologies); Tomorrow’s Investment Rules 2.00, supra note 145, at 21 (“Against this 
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To be clear, many sustainability data providers understand—and are taking 
steps to address—the problems identified above. To take just one example, 
MSCI, a leader in the field of sustainability analytics, recently developed the 
MSCI ACWI Sustainable Impact Index, which uses an array of targeted 
sustainability factors to identify sustainability leaders.189 Meanwhile, several 
data providers are attempting to incorporate companies’ forward-looking 
sustainability policies and management plans into their metrics databases.190 Still 
others have taken steps to encourage third-party auditing and verification of self-
disclosed corporate sustainability data.191 However, as discussed in the following 
Section, economic theory suggests that voluntary disclosure regimes alone 
cannot efficiently harness mainstream investor interest in sustainability. Instead, 
this Article argues that the sustainability-information deficit is best addressed by 
developing a new model of information regulation that is tailored to the priorities 
and needs of the mainstream investor. 
III.  Sustainability Information Regulation for the Mainstream Investor 
To fully harness investor interest in sustainability, this Article calls for a 
mandatory sustainability reporting regime that provides investors with both 
sustainability red lights and green lights.192 In doing so, it recognizes that such a 
proposal deviates from the traditional understanding of environmental 
 
current backdrop of uneven nonfinancial [ESG] information from companies, it comes as little surprise 
that more than one-quarter of respondents report that companies’ non-financial performance did not play 
a pivotal role in their investment decisions even once during the previous year.”). 
 189.   See MSCI ACWI Sustainable Impact Index, MSCI, https://www.msci.com/msci-
acwi-sustainable-impact-index [https://perma.cc/RW3N-ELY8] (“The MSCI ACWI Sustainable Impact 
Index aims to identify companies that derive at least 50% of their revenues from products and services 
that address environmental and social challenges . . . .”); see also Esty & Cort, supra note 14, at 24-25 
(describing these and other efforts by ESG data providers to develop metrics that focus on material 
sustainability factors). 
 190.   Douglas, supra note 122, at 107 (reviewing some of these efforts to develop future-
oriented sustainability metrics); Ezeokoli et al., supra note 122, at B-15 (noting that the HIP Investor 
Rating produces a sustainability score that seeks to “quantif[y] the mitigators of future risk and drivers of 
return potential”); Overview of ESG Rating Agencies, NOVETHIC 43 (Oct. 2014), 
https://www.novethic.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/tx_ausynovethicetudes/pdf_complets/2014_Overview-
of-ESG-rating-agencies.pdf [https://perma.cc/SN36-LFWG] (observing that “South Pole Carbon offers a 
forward-looking climate impact assessment together with the [Climate Disclosure Project]: it gives 
investees[] individual positioning towards the risks and opportunities of climate change”). 
 191.   For example, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development’s 
Assurance Project aims to “inspire interest in external assurance amongst [its] members, informing and 
preparing them for such engagements and an approach for reporters and assurance providers to maximize 
value creation and reduce inefficiency.” Assurance: Generating Value from External Assurance of 
Sustainability Reporting, WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 2 (Feb. 2016), 
https://docs.wbcsd.org/2016/02/WBCSD_Redefining_assurance_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/8S56-
KN8V] [hereinafter Generating Value]. 
 192.   Others have called for new mandatory reporting requirements of environmental 
performance information. See, e.g., Case, supra note 1, at 387. However, this Article departs from past 
literature by calling for a disclosure regime that is tailored to the needs of mainstream investors. It 
therefore advocates for a new model of information regulation that is focused on business fundamentals 
and capable of guiding capital markets away from sustainability laggards and toward sustainability 
leaders. 
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information regulation as a tool used primarily for spotlighting bad 
environmental behavior. But, as Section III.A discusses, the public nature of 
sustainability metrics justifies this reorientation of environmental information 
regulation. Section III.B then outlines several core principles for developing a 
mandatory sustainability disclosure regime that can address the needs of 
mainstream investors. Section III.C concludes by arguing that the benefits of 
such a regulation outweigh the costs. 
A. Economic Rationale for Mandatory Disclosure 
Can the private sector address the sustainability information needs of 
today’s mainstream investors without government help or a mandatory 
disclosure regime? Such an outcome is possible in theory. Voluntary disclosures 
on key sustainability metrics could, for example, increase as a result of mounting 
pressures from shareholders.193 Likewise, data providers might eventually 
reformulate their sustainability metrics to better address the informational needs 
of mainstream investors.194 Over time, market pressures and greater stakeholder 
dialogue could transform today’s largely voluntary disclosure framework into a 
vehicle capable of maximizing investors’ appetite for sustainability.195 
Three characteristics of corporate sustainability metrics, however, suggest 
that voluntary reporting schemes alone will not adequately or efficiently 
overcome the informational barriers to sustainable investing.196 First, 
information on corporate sustainability practices is—like nearly all forms of 
information—a public good.197 Firms cannot easily limit the consumption of 
sustainability information once publicized (i.e., information is nonexcludable), 
and use of such information does not reduce its availability to other parties (i.e., 
 
 193.   See, e.g., Andrea Vittorio, Investors to SEC: We Want Better Sustainability 
Reporting, BLOOMBERG BNA (July 26, 2016), https://www.bna.com/investors-secwe-better-
n73014445306 [https://perma.cc/FE2N-74GD] (“Investors representing trillions of dollars around the 
world are asking the [SEC] to approach corporate reporting on environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) issues . . . .”). 
 194.   As noted above, some are already doing so. See supra notes 189-191. 
 195.   Lydenberg et al., supra note 168, at 5-6 (observing that voluntary reporting 
regimes have made “valuable contributions” but ultimately concluding that a mandatory sustainability 
reporting framework is needed to overcome existing problems with ESG data). 
 196.   Case, supra note 1, at 387 (calling for a “comprehensive system of mandatory 
reporting of environmental performance information”); Lydenberg et al., supra note 168, at 4 (“[W]ithout 
mandatory reporting, the crucial task of transforming sustainability reporting into actual improvements in 
sustainability performance will remain an especially difficult task.”). 
 197.   For some of the first discussions of public goods, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic 
Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE 
ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS, 609, 614-15 (NBER ed., 1962) (characterizing information 
as a public good); and Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 387, 387 (1954) (formalizing the definition of public goods). See also Case, supra note 1, at 440 
(characterizing sustainability data as a public good). 
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information is nonrivalrous).198 As a result, freeriding incentives can work to 
limit the production of publicly available information on corporate sustainability 
practices to below socially optimal levels.199 Specifically, when a company 
releases sustainability data to the public, its shareholders benefit from new 
insights into the firm’s management and operational processes.200 But those 
insights can also accrue to rival firms, who can exploit the once-proprietary 
information to their advantage.201 Competitors, for example, might copy the 
disclosing firm’s strategies for streamlining supply chains or its plans for 
investing in sustainability-driven growth areas.202 Thus, because firms cannot 
capture all the benefits of sustainability information disclosures (i.e., it cannot 
easily charge other firms for using that information), economic theory predicts 
that the private sector will underproduce sustainability-related information if left 
to its own devices.203 
Second, externalities caused by corporate greenwashing further reduce the 
incentives to disclose on sustainability metrics. When a company reports 
inaccurate information on its sustainability practices, it damages not only its own 
reputation but also the trustworthiness of sustainability metrics in general.204 
These negative externalities result from information asymmetries between 
companies and shareholders. Because sustainability data often pertain to the 
internal workings of the firm, investors cannot easily ascertain the veracity of 
self-reported, voluntarily disclosed company data.205 Thus, investors cannot 
 
 198.   See 3 HUGH GRAVELLE & RAY REES, MICROECONOMICS 326 (2004) (defining the 
properties of a public good); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 
DUKE L.J. 1693, 1699-1700 (2008) (describing knowledge as a public good). 
 199.   See Kennedy et al., supra note 50, at 32 (describing the freeriding incentives in the 
production of new ideas); Zachary Liscow & Quentin Karpilow, Innovation Snowballing and Climate 
Law, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 385, 395-96 (2017) (same). 
 200.   For a discussion of how disclosure of sustainability information can induce 
internal and peer-to-peer learning, see supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. 
 201.   See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 686 (1984). 
 202.   Indeed, new value-generating sustainability strategies can perhaps be best 
understood as a form of research and development (R&D). There exists a vast literature showing that the 
private sector underinvests in R&D because firms rarely capture the full benefits of their investments in 
innovative ideas and technologies. See Bronwyn H. Hall et al., Measuring the Returns to R&D, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 1033-82 (Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 
2010) (reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature on R&D externalities). 
 203.   See Case, supra note 1, at 441. 
 204.   Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 290-91 (“In the absence of verifiable reporting 
standards and publicly accessible comparative performance data, some firms may exploit opportunities to 
provide the public with misleading (even if not overtly false) information. This could be done by 
overstating environmental accomplishments while selectively omitting or obscuring damaging and 
potentially undercutting incentives for even top environmental performers to self-report because such 
reports may be deemed unreliable by a skeptical public.”). Notably, the capacious definition of 
sustainability creates ample opportunities for selective and misleading reporting. See Esty & Cort, supra 
note 14, at 15 (noting the lack of consensus on what sustainability means). 
 205.   See Beatriz Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., Mitigating Information Asymmetry 
Through Sustainability Assurance: The Role of Accountants and Levels of Assurance, 26 INT’L BUS. REV. 
1141, 1141 (2017) (discussing how information asymmetries reduce the value of sustainability data to 
investors and firms alike); Chatterji et al., supra note 169, at 126 (“It can be difficult, however, for 
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distinguish between accurate and inaccurate sustainability reporting. Discoveries 
of corporate greenwashing, therefore, can breed distrust in sustainability 
disclosure mechanisms as a whole.206 In turn, these dynamics reduce both the 
incentives to accurately report sustainability data and the market value of 
sustainability leadership, since companies that accurately report on their high 
sustainability performance might nonetheless be labeled as “greenwashers” due 
to the misreporting of others.207 In this way, the market for corporate 
sustainability becomes a market for lemons: because investors cannot 
differentiate sustainability leaders from sustainability imitators, markets will not 
reward sustainability leadership with a premium.208 Of course, third-party 
auditing and verification of sustainability reporting could mitigate some of these 
negative externalities by reducing the information asymmetries between 
companies and investors.209 That said, firms will only voluntarily pay for these 
external assurance services if the financial benefits that they will receive from 
an external audit and verification outweigh its costs. Given that these companies 
do not fully internalize the benefits of their sustainability disclosures in general, 
 
stakeholders to evaluate companies’ environmental impacts.”); Sarah Elena Windolph, Assessing 
Corporate Sustainability Through Ratings: Challenges and Their Causes, 1 J. ENVTL. SUSTAINABILITY 
37, 40 (2011) (“Consumers, investors, and other stakeholders are not able to verify the sustainability 
claims made by companies, because they do not have access to the relevant information. This not only 
affects products, but also processes inside companies and along supply chains.”). 
 206.   See Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 290-91 (observing that “some firms may exploit 
opportunities to provide the public with misleading (even if not overtly false) information,” thereby 
“reducing the value of self-reported information generally”); William S. Laufer, Social Accountability 
and Corporate Greenwashing, 43 J. BUS. ETHICS 253, 255-258 (2003) (raising concerns about corporate 
greenwashing); Bailey et al., supra note 149, at 3 (underscoring investors’ need for “a kind of 
‘greenwashing’ detector”); Lewis et. al., supra note 14, at 36 (identifying concerns about greenwashing 
as a major barrier to sustainable investment integration); Serafeim & Grewal, supra note 126, at 11 (noting 
that ESG reporting has been undermined by concerns about “goodwashing”). 
 207.   Case, supra note 1, at 395 (“Unquestionably, instances of disclosure of inaccurate 
or misleading information substantially reduce the value of self-reporting mechanisms generally. Public 
skepticism engendered by misleading or inaccurate reporting undercuts incentives for even superior 
environmental performers to voluntarily report due to concern that even accurate, reliably informative 
reporting will be viewed as nothing more than ‘green washing.’”). Indeed, in some instances, it might be 
in the best interest of sustainability laggards to artificially inflate their sustainability performance. If their 
cheating goes undiscovered, they can erase any stock advantages that accrue to sustainability leaders. On 
the other hand, if they are discovered, they can still reduce any stock premium associated with 
sustainability leadership by engendering investor distrust of sustainability reporting in general. 
 208.   See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty 
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (explaining how information asymmetries can 
cause low-quality products to drive high-quality products out of a market). 
 209.   See Ryan J. Casey & Jonathan H. Grenier, Understanding and Contributing to the 
Enigma of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Assurance in the United States, 32 AUDITING: J. 
PRACTICE & THEORY 97, 108 (2015) (“Assurance, by improving the information provided to users, further 
reduces information asymmetry.”); Iris H-Y Chiu, Standardization in Corporate Social Responsibility 
Reporting and a Universalist Concept of CSR?—A Path Paved with Good Intentions, 22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 
361, 387 (2010) (“Information asymmetry between the corporation (essentially management) and others 
is at the root for the demand for assurance services . . . .”); Ana Zorio et al., Sustainability Development 
and the Quality of Assurance Reports: Empirical Evidence, 22 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T 484, 486 (2013) 
(noting that “the importance of assurance comes from the need to mitigate information asymmetry with 
institutional creditors”). 
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it seems unlikely that voluntary third-party auditing and verification can raise 
sustainability reporting to socially optimal levels.210 
Third, this under-reporting problem is exacerbated by the comparative 
nature of sustainability metrics. Investors want sustainability data in order to 
rank companies in terms of their sustainability practices—i.e., to separate the 
leaders from the laggards.211 Firms therefore have a strategic incentive to avoid 
disclosing information that will make them look worse than their competitors.212 
Thus, many scholars and investors worry that sustainability data produced 
through voluntary disclosure regimes will be biased due to selective reporting.213 
These concerns are not unfounded, as prior studies have shown a tendency 
among firms to emphasize positive sustainability information and downplay the 
negative aspects of their sustainability track record.214 
Of course, if investors interpret a firm’s failure to disclose on a particular 
indicator as a signal for poor performance, it might mitigate the incentives to 
selectively disclose.215 According to this so-called “signaling theory,” firms will 
voluntarily disclose any and all good news that will make them more attractive 
to investors.216 Markets, in turn, will equate no news with bad news—and 
penalize nondisclosures accordingly.217 Fearing that markets will overpenalize 
them for missing data, firms will voluntarily disclose bad news, resulting 
eventually in the complete disclosure of all material information—good and 
bad.218 
 
 210.   Casey & Grenier, supra note 209, at 98 (attributing the relatively low demand for 
sustainability auditing and verification practices to their perceived costs); Generating Value, supra note 
191, at 26 (2016) (noting the perception among some firms that costs of external assurance of 
sustainability reports outweighs its benefits). 
 211.   See supra Section II.B. 
 212.   See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 201, at 687; Stewart, supra note 6, at 139 
(observing that “businesses rarely have a market incentive” to disclose negative information). 
 213.   See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 122, at 104 (discussing how voluntary reporting can 
lead to selective and biased ESG reporting); Lewis et al., supra note 14, at 36 (discussing investor concerns 
about greenwashing). 
 214.   Rudiger Hahn & Regina Lulfs, Legitimizing Negative Aspects in GRI-Oriented 
Sustainability Reporting: A Qualitative Analysis of Corporate Disclosure Strategies, 123 J. BUS. ETHICS 
401, 402 (2014) (reviewing this literature); Lois S. Mahoney et al., A Research Note on Standalone 
Corporate Social Responsibility Reports: Signaling or Greenwashing?, 24 CRITICAL PERSP. ACCT. 350, 
357 (2013) (citing evidence of “companies with ‘bad’ social and environmental activities voluntarily 
releas[ing] their social and environmental activities in a positive light and fail[ing] to disclose negative 
environmental performance or disclos[ing] it in less detail to protect their self-interests”). 
 215.   See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 201, at 683 (explaining this signaling theory 
in detail). See generally Steven A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications of 
Modern Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION (Franklin R. 
Edwards ed., 1979) (same). Notably, sustainability data providers can reinforce these signaling incentives 
by penalizing firms for failing to report on key metrics—e.g., by replacing missing data (nondisclosures) 
with lower-than-average scores. See Esty & Cort, supra note 14, at 37. 
 216.   Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance: 
The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 336 n.14 (2003). 
 217.   Id. 
 218.   Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 201, at 683 (“Once the firm starts disclosing it 
cannot stop short of making any critical revelation, because investors always assume the worst. It must 
disclose the bad with the good, lest investors assume that the bad is even worse than it is.”); Allen Ferrell, 
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While the signaling theory might have some explanatory power in the 
context of corporate financial disclosures,219 it is a particularly poor fit for 
corporate sustainability disclosures. To begin, nonresponses are, at best, a crude 
proxy for poor sustainability performance.220 As noted above, firms tend to 
under-report on sustainability metrics—both because they cannot capture the full 
benefits of their data disclosures and because the negative externalities of 
corporate greenwashing reduce the value of sustainability disclosures in general. 
In addition, some firms may fail to report good sustainability news simply 
because the costs of reporting outweigh the perceived benefits of publicizing this 
information.221 As a result, no news should not be equated with bad news when 
it comes to sustainability. Instead, investors face the challenging task of 
determining which nonresponses are due to businesses strategically hiding their 
unsustainable practices and which have more benign causes.222 This task is made 
all the more difficult by investors’ general lack of familiarity with sustainability 
issues.223 To date, mainstream investors have struggled to interpret and utilize 
reported sustainability data; the interpretative challenges are even greater for 
missing sustainability data.224 Arguably then, the signaling theory’s central 
 
The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation Around the World 9-10 (Harvard John M. 
Olin Ctr. for Law, Economics & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 492, 2004) (“Simply put, firms that wish to 
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in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 387, 418 (2001) (“The signaling 
hypothesis regarding information disclosure is a plausible scenario in today’s capital markets in which the 
majority of investors are sophisticated institutional investors.”), with Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory 
Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1361 
(1999) (“While the signaling phenomenon means that the market will be better informed in a system of 
issuer choice than might first appear, it will not be as well informed as it would be if all issuers were 
compelled to disclose at the higher level that some issuers choose voluntarily.”). 
 220.   Professor Merritt B. Fox makes a similar point when arguing in favor of securities 
regulations requiring disclosure of financial data to investors. He argues that “[s]ilence is not a complete 
substitute for affirmatively disclosing [information] because the market knows that an issuer could choose 
a low-disclosure regime for reasons other than a lack of good news.” He notes, in particular, that “an 
issuer may choose not to disclose because revealing the information might put it in an inferior position 
vis-à-vis a competitor, major supplier, or major customer.” Fox, supra note 219, at 1361. 
 221.   Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Consequences of Mandatory Corporate 
Sustainability Reporting 14 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper 11-100, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1799589 [https://perma.cc/2CCH-5Z7D] 
(“[S]ustainability disclosure regulations might decrease firm value by imposing significant preparation 
costs (e.g., environmental management systems for gathering environmental information) on firms.”); 
Generating Value, supra note 191, at 26 (observing that some firms believe that costs of external assurance 
of sustainability reports outweighs its benefits). Nondisclosures resulting from reporting costs may not 
matter from an efficiency standpoint. See Ferrell, supra note 218, at 10. However, as discussed below, 
economic efficiency is not necessarily the appropriate metric for measuring the desirability of a mandatory 
sustainability disclosure framework. 
 222.   Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 175, at 687-88 (discussing similar challenges 
when interpreting missing data on corporate finances); Fox, supra note 220, at 1361 (same). 
 223.   See supra notes 149-153 and accompanying text. 
 224.   See supra notes 183-188 and accompanying text. 
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assumption—that “a sufficient number of investors understand the significance 
of nondisclosure”225—is not met in the case of sustainability data. 
In light of the above market failures, this Article suspects that voluntary 
disclosure regimes alone will not generate the types of comprehensive, 
standardized, and trustworthy sustainability metrics that mainstream investors 
can confidently incorporate into their portfolio management policies. Indeed, it 
is notable that, despite decades of experimentation in—and development of—
voluntary sustainability reporting, investors are still frustrated with existing 
sustainability datasets.226 Environmental regulators should therefore follow in 
the footsteps of American financial regulators and mandate corporate disclosures 
on material sustainability issues.227 A mandatory reporting regime would 
significantly reduce the nonreporting and selective-reporting problems that 
currently plague sustainability metrics.228 It would also lower costs over time as 
standard forms and guidance become widespread. And as discussed in the 
following Section, carefully designed regulations can also enhance investor 
confidence in sustainability reporting by developing robust methodological 
standards that facilitate comparability across material sustainability issues. 
Before moving to these additional design considerations, however, it is 
worth briefly noting this Article’s relationship to the voluminous literature on 
mandatory financial reporting requirements. Since the passage of the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, legal scholars and 
economists have debated the effectiveness and desirability of a federal 
mandatory disclosure regime for public company securities.229 Some maintain 
that mandatory disclosure reduces information asymmetries between firms and 
shareholders, boosts corporate reporting of financial data, increases investor 
confidence in capital markets, and enhances the nation’s economic efficiency.230 
Others, however, question the extent to which market forces underproduce 
 
 225.   Romano, supra note 219, at 418; see also Roberta Romano, Empowering 
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2367 (1998). 
 226.   See Case, supra note 1, at 388-91 (tracing the history of voluntary corporate 
sustainability reporting). For a discussion of the problems with current sustainability metrics, see Section 
II.B of this Article. 
 227.   See id. at 387 (arriving at a similar conclusion). 
 228.   Lydenberg et al., supra note 168, at 5 (arguing that mandatory ESG reporting 
would address many of the problems with existing ESG data, including lack of data comparability and 
selective reporting). 
 229.   Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure 
System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 1-2 (1983). The debate rapidly escalated in the 1960s, when financial economists 
began arguing that disclosure was not required to protect ordinary investors from buying unfairly priced 
stock. See Fox, supra note 216, at 335-36. 
 230.   See, e.g., Fox, supra note 216, at 334 (providing empirical evidence that 
mandatory disclosures rules increase share price accuracy); Fox, supra note 219, at 1338 (“This Article 
argues that, despite these apparent attractions, we should reject issuer choice and retain the current 
mandatory system.”); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities 
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 711-12 (2006) (arguing for the efficiency of a mandatory disclosure regime 
for securities on the grounds that it reduces search costs and information verification costs); Seligman, 
supra note 229, at 9 (explaining the historical rationale for the SEC’s mandatory corporate disclosure 
system). 
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corporate financial information.231 And even assuming that voluntary disclosures 
result in sub-optimal levels of information, these critics challenge the 
effectiveness of federal mandatory disclosure regulations, arguing that these 
requirements either do not raise social welfare (once the costs of regulation are 
taken into account) or are less efficient than other regulatory regimes (e.g., state 
disclosure regulations).232 
This Article does not take a position on these debates. The issues that are 
most contentious in the literature on mandatory financial reporting are less 
central to evaluating the desirability of mandatory sustainability reporting. In 
particular, scholars have reasonably disagreed over whether markets 
underproduce financial information as an empirical matter.233 By contrast, there 
is clear evidence of a sustainability information shortage. As discussed above, 
response rates for today’s voluntary sustainability disclosure regimes are 
strikingly low; mainstream investors have expressed widespread frustration with 
the coverage of existing sustainability metrics; and market analysts agree that 
these data gaps have significantly impeded the growth of sustainable 
investing.234 At the same time, empirical evidence from the TRI program—as 
well as from other mandatory disclosure programs enacted in other 
countries235—strongly suggests that companies do not voluntarily disclose all 
financially material sustainability information. If they did, stock market prices 
should not have declined in response to TRI disclosures.236 
More importantly though, the goals of mandatory sustainability reporting 
differ from those of mandatory financial reporting. While improving the 
efficiency of capital markets is often viewed as the central justification of 
financial securities regulation,237 sustainability information regulation aims to 
 
 231.   See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to 
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empirical literature that “[t]here is little tangible proof of the claim that corporate information is 
‘underproduced’ in the absence of mandatory disclosure, or that the benefits to investors from information 
that firms would not produce in the absence of mandatory disclosure actually outweigh their costs”), with 
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 234.   See supra notes 178-182 and accompanying text. 
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disclosed by companies in China, Denmark, Malaysia, and South Africa). 
 236.   See supra notes 32-37 & 54-61 and accompanying text. 
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An Argument for Imposing Disclosure Requirements on Public Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 123, 
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further ESG policy objectives by harnessing untapped investor interest in 
sustainability. This Article’s definition of success therefore encompasses 
disclosure requirements that shift capital away from unsustainable firms and 
toward sustainable ones, even if they do not necessarily improve—or perhaps 
even reduce—the efficiency of stock prices. Of course, this Article is mindful of 
the reporting costs imposed on firms by mandatory disclosure regimes, which it 
argues can be minimized through carefully designed disclosure requirements.238 
However, in weighing the costs and benefits of a mandatory sustainability 
reporting regime, Section III.C of this Article adopts a more expansive view of 
welfare that goes beyond capital market efficiency to include the many 
environmental externalities that are not currently being priced into today’s 
markets. 
B. Core Design Considerations 
Mandatory disclosure is, of course, only one component of an effective 
sustainability reporting regime for mainstream investors. To fully harness 
investor interest in sustainability, a new model of information regulation is 
needed to elicit the right types of information that are material to mainstream 
investors. This Section outlines several key considerations for guiding the 
development of such a mandatory sustainability reporting regime. 
First, such efforts should focus on developing a menu of sustainability 
metrics that allow investors to tailor their sustainability interests to their 
investment goals.239 As noted earlier, mainstream investors vary greatly in terms 
of their sustainability and financial objectives.240 The mandatory sustainability 
reporting regime should account for this heterogeneity in preferences by offering 
a range of metrics that measure different dimensions of sustainability. Limits 
should be placed, however, on the number of sustainability metrics that any 
given firm must report on, as an overly expansive set of mandatory reporting 
requirements will be costly for firms and confusing for investors.241 
 
126 (2004) (identifying efficiency as the main rationale for federal disclosure requirements on public 
companies). 
 238.   For a more detailed discussion of this point, see infra Section III.C. 
 239.   See Esty & Cort, supra note 14, at 41. 
 240.   See supra Section II.B. 
 241.   For example, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)—a well-known voluntary 
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tension with GRI’s stated goal of highlighting the most material issues.” Esty & Cort, supra note 14, at 
33; see also Douglas, supra note 122, at 102 (finding that top ESG data providers track hundreds of 
sustainability indicators); Alnoor Ebrahim & V. Kasturi Rangan, What Impact?: A Framework for 
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risk of being counterproductive in the long run, both by drawing precious resources away from services 
and by putting too much emphasis on outcomes for which the causal links are unclear”); Roca & Searcy, 
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To balance these competing interests, this Article recommends a reporting 
structure with three tiers of sustainability metrics, namely: (1) core indicators, 
(2) industry-specific indicators, and (3) governance indicators. The first tier of 
core indicators would cover a small set (no more than ten to fifteen) of material 
sustainability issues that are shared by all industries. Thus, these core indicators 
have two defining features. First, they are tightly focused on sustainability 
factors that have strong, direct impacts on financial performance—both long 
term and short term. And second, they only include sustainability issues that are 
common to businesses across different industries. Greenhouse gas emissions and 
energy efficiency, for example, would likely qualify as common core issues, as 
nearly all companies have an energy and carbon footprint that exposes them to 
policy and market shifts toward decarbonization.242 Core indicators therefore 
allow mainstream investors to make broad comparisons across industries on 
sustainability issues that strongly correlate with business fundamentals. 
By contrast, the second tier of industry-specific indicators would track 
those sustainability dimensions deemed most material to businesses within each 
industry.243 As others have noted, the materiality of many sustainability issues 
varies substantially across sectors of the economy.244 A case in point: toxic waste 
is likely a material indicator for the electronics industry but not for financial 
services. Thus, a reporting regime that focused only on sustainability issues 
shared by all industries would miss this important variation. Instead, investors 
need a second tier of industry-specific indicators that drill down on the most 
pressing sustainability challenges facing different segments of the economy and 
that are detailed enough to sort sustainability leaders from laggards within each 
industry. As with core indicators, the selection of industry-specific metrics 
should be guided by the principles of materiality. Done correctly, then, second-
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specific ESG metrics). 
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tier metrics should create a tailored portrait of the sustainability obstacles and 
opportunities that are most likely to impact the financial trajectory of companies 
in a given industry. 
Finally, the third tier of governance indicators would apply to all industries 
and would focus on a company’s institutional capacity to respond to 
sustainability pressures and opportunities. Such indicators might cover, for 
example, the degree to which the company’s board oversees and addresses 
sustainability issues; whether the company has established procedures for 
monitoring sustainability risks in its supply and value chains; whether the firm 
has a centralized team dedicated to developing best practices for sustainability 
management; and whether the company has mechanisms for systematically 
integrating sustainability considerations into investment and business strategy 
decisions, such as an internal price on carbon. Governance indicators, however, 
should not be limited solely to measuring institutional investments in 
sustainability management. A company’s responsiveness to present and future 
sustainability pressures also depends on the quality of its governance and 
management practices more generally. Thus, this third-tier of governance 
indicators should also track a company’s workforce training investments, human 
resource management practices, and allocation of responsibilities between 
officers and the board. These general measures of corporate institutional health 
may not be directly linked to financial growth in the short or medium run, as is 
the case with many core sustainability issues.245 However, they are critical to the 
long-run health of a company and, if mismanaged, these types of governance 
issues can devastate a firm, as illustrated by Uber’s recent string of corporate 
management fiascos.246 Ultimately, by measuring both a company’s governance 
structures around sustainability and a company’s governance practices more 
generally, the third tier of governance indicators would provide mainstream 
investors with much-needed insights into a company’s ability to ride the 
sustainability wave of the future. 
Notwithstanding these differences, materiality should be the central 
principle guiding the development of indicators at all three tiers of the proposed 
reporting structure. Materiality, in turn, should be defined with the mainstream 
investor in mind—recognizing that many sustainability-minded investors want 
to get a line of sight on issues, such as climate change, that may not be financially 
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Longer, FORBES (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackperkowski/2017/09/07/how-electric-
vehicles-are-changing-the-auto-landscape [https://perma.cc/H9K3-YW2H]. By contrast, it is difficult to 
envision a new business strategy or product line arising from innovations in corporate governance or 
human resource management, even though both are critical to firm performance. 
 246.   See generally John Boudreau, Uber Is Finally Realizing HR Isn’t Just for 
Recruiting, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 8, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/uber-is-finally-realizing-hr-isnt-
just-for-recruiting [https://perma.cc/DL9C-CQBV] (documenting how Uber’s human resource 
management practices have created a crisis for the company). 
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material in the short term (especially where policies to control greenhouse gas 
emissions are being withdrawn) but are likely to affect marketplace performance 
over time.247 To the extent possible, metrics should focus on those dimensions 
of sustainability with strong empirical or theoretical links to corporate financial 
performance.248 In addition, the menu of sustainability metrics as a whole should 
enable investors to distinguish sustainability leaders from laggards. In other 
words, they should cater to the preferred investing strategies of mainstream 
shareholders by providing a set of sustainability red and green lights that can 
redirect capital away from laggards and toward leaders. Of course, it will not 
always be clear which dimensions of sustainability are most material to the 
financial performance of a firm.249 But regulators can partially mitigate this 
concern by developing metrics that focus on future operational performance, 
rather than past reputation. 
Policymakers should be careful, however, to not adopt too narrow a 
definition of materiality. Some sustainability issues may have direct, short-term 
impacts on financial performance, such as reducing toxic-waste output250 or 
improving supply-chain efficiency.251 Many others, however, will have indirect, 
longer-term effects on firm value, and these factors have traditionally been 
ignored by the financial markets’ focus on short-term profits.252 By design, some 
of these long-term value creators will be captured by the third-tier of governance 
sustainability variables. But to create a truly effective sustainability reporting 
regime, core and industry-specific sustainability metrics must also be broad 
 
 247.   See Douglas, supra note 122, at 103 (observing that “[i]nvestor concern that 
neither GRI nor IIRC provided sufficient focus on material ESG factors that most interest investors led to 
a new reporting standard developed by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB)”). 
 248.   For a discussion of mainstream investors’ preference for sustainability factors that 
correlate with financial performance, see supra notes 135-148 and accompanying text. 
 249.   See supra Section II.A. 
 250.   As discussed above in Sections I.A and I.B, markets quickly responded to 
disclosures of toxic waste under the TRI program. 
 251.   See Porter & Kramer, supra note 66, at 9 (discussing how value creation can arise 
through the careful streamlining of supply chains). 
 252.   See Clark et al., supra note 12, at 11 (“One reason for this imbalance between 
acknowledging the importance of sustainability and acting on it is pressure from the financial markets’ 
focus on short-termism.”); Lewis et al., supra note 14, at 3 (“A focus on short-term performance frequently 
leads investors to overlook material ESG issues that can play out over time.”); Orlitzky, supra note 4, at 
8 (“Probably the most direct explanation of a positive effect of CC [corporate citizenship] on CFP 
[corporate financial performance] is the view of CC as a revenue generator—especially in the long run.”). 
Indeed, it is generally understood that investments in sustainability often pay off in the medium- and long-
run. See Bonini & Bové, supra note 77, at 3 (noting the tension between “short-term earnings pressure” 
and “the longer-term nature of these [sustainability] issues”); Endrikat, supra note 85, at 740 (observing 
that “long-term effects . . . are likely to be involved in the CEP-CFP [corporate environmental 
performance-corporate financial performance] link”); Exploring ESG, supra note 155, at 1 (discussing 
how “ESG factors contribute to long-term value”); Fulton et al., supra note 143, at 29 (highlighting “the 
relatively long-term nature of E, S and G factors”); Lewis et al., supra note 14, at 33 (“To plan for ESG 
risks, companies must make large capital investments that do not necessarily generate returns in the 
immediate term.”). 
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enough to track sustainability’s potential for long-term value creation.253 The 
tricky question, of course, is determining how broad is “broad enough.” Non-
government data providers have struggled with this problem over the years, often 
leading to divergent outcomes. The Sustainability Accountability Standards 
Board (SASB), for example, has adopted a narrow definition of materiality that 
has resulted in just two to ten sustainability metrics per industry.254 In contrast, 
the GRI’s expanded view of materiality has produced a reporting framework that 
asks companies to assess up to fifty-eight “General Standard Disclosures,” 
eighty-two “Specific Standard Disclosures,” and various other “Sector 
Supplement Disclosures.”255 We suspect that the optimal number of metrics lies 
somewhere in between the SASB’s number and the GRI’s. Further, we believe 
that our proposed three-tiered reporting regime will help policymakers strike the 
right balance. On the one hand, the regime’s dedicated focus on materiality, as 
understood by the mainstream investor, works to limit the number of 
sustainability indicators included in the reporting framework. On the other hand, 
the regulation’s three tiers of metrics—core, industry-specific, and 
governance—work to create tailored, multilayered portraits of the sustainability 
challenges and opportunities facing each industry. 
For initial guidance on this three-tiered reporting structure, policymakers 
can look to the disclosure framework developed by the Task Force on Climate-
Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD).256 Chaired by Michael Bloomberg, the 
TCFD recently released a voluntary disclosure framework for companies to 
report climate-related information in their financial filings.257 Materiality is the 
guiding force behind this framework, which the TCFD expressly designed to 
address the informational needs of mainstream investors, lenders, insurers, and 
 
 253.   See Lydenberg et al., supra note 168, at 20 (proposing a definition of ESG 
materiality that “is broader in scope than the definitions of materiality historically used by financial 
regulatory parties”); Marcy Murninghan & Ted Grant, Redefining Materiality II: Why It Matters, Who’s 
Involved, and What It Means for Corporate Leaders and Boards, ACCOUNTABILITY 2 (Aug. 2013), 
https://www.accountability.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Redefining-Materiality-2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NT23-RCUW] (calling for an expanded definition of materiality that accounts for the 
risks, opportunities, and longer time horizons of sustainability issues); Implementing the 
Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures, TASK FORCE ON 
CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURE 1 (June 2017), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-TCFD-Annex-062817.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQH4-VK9T] [hereinafter 
Implementing the TCFD Recommendations] (cautioning “against prematurely concluding that climate-
related risks and opportunities are not material based on perceptions of the longer-term nature of some 
climate-related risks”). 
 254.   See SASB Materiality Map, SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., 
https://materiality.sasb.org/?hsCtaTracking=28ae6e2d-2004-4a52-887f-819b72e9f70a%7C160e7227-
a2ed-4f28-af33-dff50a769cf4 [https://perma.cc/54Q4-HWLG] (containing an interactive table listing 
industry-specific sustainability performance metrics). 
 255.   See Esty & Cort, supra note 14, at 32-33. 
 256.   See generally About the Task Force, TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. 
DISCLOSURES, https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/about/# [https://perma.cc/D8AA-C9MD] (describing the 
TCFD). 
 257.   Implementing the TCFD Recommendations, supra note 253, at 1 (discussing the 
TCFD’s history). 
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other market stakeholders.258 As such, the TCFD aims to solicit “decision-useful, 
forward-looking information on financial impacts” arising from both the risks 
and opportunities presented by global warming.259 Toward that end, the TCFD 
organizes its disclosures around four core elements, namely: (1) governance, (2) 
strategy, (3) risk management, and (4) metrics and targets.260 Under the first 
element, companies disclose information relating to the board and management’s 
roles in overseeing, assessing, and addressing climate-related risks and 
opportunities.261 Thus, the governance element of the disclosure regime seeks to 
measure the level of attention that corporate leadership dedicates to climate 
issues. In contrast, the strategy element elicits information that will allow 
investors to catalogue the climate-related risks and opportunities facing each 
company.262 For instance, the TCFD recommends that all companies describe in 
their disclosures any business risks or opportunities posed by climate change 
over the short-, medium-, and long-term time horizon.263 It further urges 
companies to consider how climate change will impact their products, services, 
supply chains, and operations, as well as how they might adapt their business 
models to a warmer world with stricter climate regulations.264 Next, under the 
risk management element, companies are encouraged to describe the internal 
programs and procedures that they have in place for identifying and managing 
climate-related risks.265 Thus, these risk-management disclosures focus on the 
company’s ability and readiness to respond to, and get ahead of, the downsides 
of climate change. Finally, the TCFD recommends that companies disclose (1) 
all climate-related targets that they have set for themselves (e.g., targets for 
reducing emissions, water use, and energy) and (2) any performance metrics that 
they are using to track their progress toward those targets.266 
While the TCFD encourages all companies to report on these four core 
elements, it also recognizes that the materiality of climate change varies by 
sector.267 It therefore provides supplemental guidelines for industries that face 
unique climate change challenges and risks, including those in the energy, 
 
 258.   See Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial 
Disclosures, TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, at iii (2017), https://www.fsb-
tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-2017-TCFD-Report-11052018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KM8T-WSCJ] (“The Task Force was asked to develop voluntary, consistent climate-
related financial disclosures that would be useful to investors, lenders, and insurance underwriters in 
understanding material risks.”). 
 259.   Id. at iii. 
 260.   See Implementing the TCFD Recommendations, supra note 253, at 11-12. 
 261.   Id. at 14. 
 262.   Id. at 15-16. 
 263.   Id. 
 264.   Id. 
 265.   Id. at 16-17. 
 266.   Id. at 17-18. 
 267.   Id. at 4 (“While climate change affects nearly all economic sectors, the level of 
exposure and the impact of climate-related risks differ by sector, industry, geography, and organization.”). 
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transportation, materials and buildings, and agriculture sectors.268 For example, 
this second tier of guidance drills down on the energy sector’s exposure to the 
financial risks and opportunities that could arise if changes in climate policy or 
market demand caused a structural shift toward a low-carbon energy system.269 
In contrast, TCFD’s industry-specific guidance for the agriculture sector focuses 
mainly on water use, land management, and changing weather patterns.270 Thus, 
by creating this two-tiered guidance structure, the TCFD encourages cross-
industry comparisons of common climate change issues, while at the same time 
providing capital markets with “a fuller picture of potential climate-related 
financial impacts” in particularly affected industries.271 
We believe that the TCFD provides a strong starting point for developing 
the type of reporting regime that can effectively harness mainstream investor 
interest in sustainability. Its four core elements of disclosure seek to elicit 
financially material information by focusing on how climate change intersects 
with a company’s current and future sales, operations, and business models. At 
the same time, its guidelines promote the disclosure of forward-looking climate 
performance metrics and encourage climate change planning across the short-, 
mid-, and long-term time horizons. This disclosure framework further invites 
companies to view climate change leadership as not only a risk mitigation 
strategy, but also a revenue growth strategy. If fully adopted and correctly 
implemented, this disclosure framework could greatly enhance investors’ 
understanding of both the climate-related business challenges facing today’s 
companies and the actions that each company is taking to prepare for a world 
with warming temperatures and, in all likelihood, stricter climate regulations. 
The TCFD will not, however, fully satisfy the information needs of 
mainstream investors for at least two reasons. First, it is too narrowly focused on 
climate change. The investor community, by contrast, wants ESG data on a 
broader set of sustainability issues. Second, while the TCFD articulates a two-
tiered structure of common and industry-specific disclosures, it neither specifies 
the metrics that companies should use to make these disclosures nor establishes 
uniform methodologies to ensure comparability between companies’ climate-
related metrics.272 Instead, it only provides broad guidance on the types of 
climate information that should be disclosed, leaving the actual definition and 
operationalization of climate performance indicators to the discretion of the 
companies themselves.273 Thus, for example, it is up to the companies to decide 
 
 268.   Id. at 2 (identifying as particularly impacted industries energy; transportation; 
materials and buildings; and agriculture, food, and forest products). 
 269.   Id. at 52. 
 270.   Id. at 62. 
 271.   Id. at 4. 
 272.   Id. at 17-20 (providing guidance on climate change metrics and targets and 
directing companies to select metrics from an array of existing climate disclosure indicators, including 
GRI, CDP, and CDSB). 
 273.   Id. 
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whether their climate targets should be defined on an absolute basis (e.g., tons of 
carbon emissions) or an intensity basis (e.g., emissions per product), the time 
frames over which each target applies, and the base year from which progress 
toward a target is measured.274 Furthermore, the TCFD permits companies to 
determine which climate-related issues are most material to them—that is, to 
pick and choose what their climate-related metrics measure.275 As a result, one 
consumer goods company might disclose water consumption at its factories. 
Another might report water consumption across its entire supply chain, and still 
another might not even include measures of water use, deeming the risk of future 
water shortages to be immaterial to its business model. This flexible, deferential 
approach toward ESG reporting is understandable, given that the TCFD is a 
voluntary framework that can advise, but not compel, corporate disclosures. 
However, as this Article has repeatedly stressed, a key shortcoming of existing 
sustainability metrics is their lack of completeness and comparability. 
It is therefore critical that the proposed mandatory disclosure regime limits 
company discretion over sustainability reporting by clearly defining and 
specifying indicators for all three tiers of sustainability metrics. Toward that end, 
regulators should create a uniform set of methodological standards for 
sustainability reporting and metrics development. For guidance, regulators can 
look to existing methodological standards on finance, such as those produced by 
FASB, the International Monetary Fund, or the Bank of England.276 In line with 
investor surveys, regulators should implement procedures for normalizing 
sustainability data, so investors can make meaningful comparisons across 
companies in an industry.277 For example, firms that outsource production need 
to be held accountable for the environmental impacts of their supply chains to 
ensure an apples-to-apples comparison with vertically integrated firms.278 The 
standards should also require third-party verification and assurance of self-
reported data in order to alleviate concerns about greenwashing.279 To maximize 
 
 274.   Id. at 18. 
 275.   Id. 
 276.   See Esty & Cort, supra note 14, at 40 (stating that among other things, these 
finance methodological standards provide “procedures for statistical analysis; processes for data 
management; strategies for avoiding data collection problems; guidelines for the use of proxy metrics, 
data aggregation, and weighting; and protocols for the normalization of divergent metrics and reporting”). 
 277.   See supra note 186 and accompanying text. For guidance on normalization, 
policymakers can look to MSCI’s ESG Ratings, which normalize company scores by industry. See 
Ezeokoli et al., supra note 122, at B-13. 
 278.   Indeed, for a variety of industries, Scope 3 emissions—which include those arising 
from a company’s supply chain—account for the majority of a company’s carbon footprint. See Christian 
Blanco et al., The State of Supply Chain Carbon Footprinting: Analysis of CDP Disclosures by US Firms, 
135 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 1189, 1189 (2016). 
 279.   See Casey & Grenier, supra note 209, at 97-98 (reviewing theoretical and 
empirical evidence suggesting that corporate social responsibility assurance can increase the value of 
sustainability disclosure); Gary F. Peters & Andrea M. Romi, The Association Between Sustainability 
Governance Characteristics and the Assurance of Corporate Sustainability Reports, 34 AUDITING: J. 
PRAC. & THEORY 163, 164 (2015) (underscoring the potential benefits of sustainability assurance “[i]n a 
time when sustainability reporting is increasingly criticized for its lack of transparency”); Danny Visscher, 
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investor confidence, regulators should make transparent any assumptions 
underlying the sustainability data, such as gap-filling procedures for missing 
data. 
It will undoubtedly be challenging to develop a robust set of material 
sustainability metrics and their underlying methodologies. Regulators, however, 
will not be starting from scratch. Over the past decade, leading nongovernmental 
data providers have amassed a wealth of knowledge about the design and 
effectiveness of sustainability metrics and reporting.280 For example, both the 
Climate Disclosure Standards Board and the TCFD have developed rigorous 
methodological standards for reporting climate-related data that are materially 
relevant to corporate financial performance.281 Meanwhile, the SASB has created 
a framework for integrating sustainability data into existing internal financial 
data controls and procedures—efforts that could significantly improve the 
comparability of sustainability metrics across companies.282 Regulators can 
therefore significantly reduce the costs and challenges of implementing a 
mandatory sustainability reporting regime by collaborating with investors, firms, 
and NGOs in the field. Indeed, nongovernmental organizations have, in many 
respects, already done much of the heavy intellectual lifting. We therefore expect 
that regulators will work primarily to collate, synthesize, streamline, and 
standardize best practices on sustainability reporting into a unified mandatory 
reporting framework. 
In the United States, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) is a 
natural home for such regulatory efforts.283 The agency could, for example, 
require mandatory disclosure of sustainability information through its 10-K 
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requirements.284 Indeed, the SEC has already issued detailed guidance on the 
disclosure of climate-related information under Regulation S-K.285 Furthermore, 
a group of investors representing more than $1 trillion in assets under 
management recently urged the agency to require stronger reporting 
requirements for a range of sustainability issues.286 
That said, the SEC is not the only regulatory body capable of spearheading 
a mandatory disclosure regime in the United States. Indeed, it may not even be 
the ideal choice, given the federal government’s current antipathy toward action 
against climate change, environmental regulation, and sustainability more 
generally.287 Stock exchanges, for example, could incorporate a mandatory 
disclosure regime on sustainability into their listing requirements.288 Notably, 
nearly sixty stock exchanges—listing over thirty thousand companies and 
holding a market capitalization of more than $55 trillion289—have already signed 
onto the Sustainability Stock Exchanges (SSE) Initiative, a UN-led “peer-to-
peer” platform that explores how exchanges can promote sustainable 
investing.290 With the expansion of this network of sustainability-minded stock 
markets, many exchanges have begun taking concrete steps to facilitate 
sustainability disclosures among listed companies, including providing 
sustainability-themed indices, communicating with stakeholders about 
sustainability problems, and creating formal guidance for issuers on reporting 
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EXCHANGES INITIATIVE, http://www.sseinitiative.org/about [https://perma.cc/VG84-ZZR2] (discussing 
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sustainability information.291 But relatively few have adopted mandatory 
sustainability disclosure policies relating to data collection, reporting, or 
verification.292 As a result, stock exchange reporting frameworks have, to date, 
produced low disclosure rates and spotty sustainability metrics.293 
Nevertheless, stock exchanges have the potential to jumpstart the 
development and adoption of a mandatory sustainability reporting framework.294 
Indeed, some have already demonstrated real leadership and innovation in 
designing mandatory sustainability disclosure rules. At the end of 2017, for 
example, the Singapore Stock Exchange replaced its voluntary sustainability 
reporting regime with a so-called comply-or-explain disclosure framework.295 
Under the new reporting rules, listed companies have two options. They can 
comply with the reporting standard by preparing and publishing an annual 
sustainability report that includes information on five “primary components,” 
namely: (1) the ESG factors that are most material to the company’s business 
strategy and model; (2) the company’s policies, practices, and performance with 
respect to those material ESG factors; (3) the company’s targets in relation to 
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material ESG issues; (4) the sustainability reporting framework that the company 
used to guide its reporting and disclosure; and (5) a statement from the 
company’s board concerning how the company integrates sustainability 
considerations into its strategic decisionmaking.296 Or they can explain their 
reasons failing to report on one or more of the primary components. Thus, the 
comply-or-explain model functions as a “soft” form of mandatory disclosure 
regulation in that companies are required to either disclose or explain their failure 
to disclose, but the choice between the two is left to each company’s discretion. 
Supporters of the comply-or-explain approach note that it has some 
advantages over both voluntary reporting frameworks and traditional mandatory 
disclosure regimes. In particular, the comply-or-explain model may provide 
greater incentives for companies to disclose information than voluntary reporting 
regimes, while simultaneously offering companies greater flexibility (and 
therefore lower compliance costs) than reporting regimes that mandate responses 
on all disclosure items.297 For example, rather than developing a costly 
monitoring program to track water consumption, a company might decide that it 
is more cost effective to explain to investors why water consumption is not 
material to its business operations or strategies. Notably, in this example, the 
company’s failure to disclose its water consumption would nonetheless disclose 
valuable information to investors, namely, that the company faces minimal 
exposure to water shortage risks. Thus, in theory, a company’s explanations for 
not disclosing under a comply-or-explain approach can themselves provide 
investors with material data on that company’s sustainability risks and 
opportunities.298 
While this Article sees real innovative potential in Singapore’s comply-or-
explain approach to mandatory sustainability reporting, it suspects that 
Singapore’s disclosure framework will nonetheless fail to provide mainstream 
investors with the sustainability metrics that they need. Like the TCFD’s regime, 
Singapore’s reporting regime allows listed companies to pick and choose which 
ESG issues and metrics to disclose.299 Although the framework’s five primary 
components of sustainability reporting provide broad guidance on the issues that 
 
 296.   See SGX-ST Listing Rules, supra note 295, at 1-2; see also Fang Eu-Lin & Sahil 
Malhotra, SGX Sustainability Reporting Guide: Key Highlights, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 1-2 (2016), 
https://www.pwc.com/sg/en/publications/assets/sustainability-reporting-sgx-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/43JR-XDPJ] (summarizing this disclosure regime). 
 297.   See Virginia Harper Ho, ‘Comply or Explain’ and the Future of Nonfinancial 
Reporting, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 317, 330 (2017) (summarizing the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the effects and benefits of comply-or-explain regimes). 
 298.   Research on comply-or-explain regulations, however, has raised serious concerns 
about the adequacy of companies’ explanations for noncompliance. In particular, several studies have 
found that, when companies elect to explain rather than comply, they frequently offer generic, boilerplate 
explanations that are of little value to investors. See id. at 333 (summarizing this literature). 
 299.   See SGX-ST Listing Rules, supra note 295, ¶ 4.2 (directing the issuer to “review 
its business in the context of the value chain and determine what ESG factors, in relation to its interaction 
with its physical environment and social community and its governance, are material for the continuity of 
its business”). 
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companies should consider when crafting their annual sustainability reports, the 
definition and operationalization of sustainability is ultimately left to each 
company’s discretion. True, the Singapore Stock Exchange encourages some 
standardization by recommending that companies make their disclosures 
according to well-established sustainability reporting frameworks, such as the 
Global Reporting Initiative’s Sustainability Reporting Guidelines.300 However, 
this Article contends that a uniform set of methodological standards will be 
needed to achieve the level of comparability that mainstream investors require. 
Ultimately, in giving listed companies so much flexibility over the substance and 
methods of ESG reporting, Singapore’s disclosure regime misses an opportunity 
create sustainability metrics that are standardized, comparable, and therefore 
useful to mainstream investors. 
Notably, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange has taken some promising steps 
in recent years to address the problem of comparability among ESG metrics. Like 
the Singapore Stock Exchange, it deploys a comply-or-explain model of 
mandatory reporting in which listed companies are supposed to make disclosures 
with respect to three “Environmental Subject Areas” and eight “Social Subject 
Areas.”301 In January of 2017, however, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange began 
requiring all listed companies to report on twelve environmental “key 
performance indicators” (KPIs).302 The KPIs are notable for their specificity and 
their quantitative nature. To take just a few examples, companies are required to 
report (or explain why they did not report) their greenhouse gas emissions, 
energy consumption, hazardous and nonhazardous waste production, and water 
consumption on an absolute basis (e.g., total tons) and on an intensity basis (e.g., 
tons per product).303 While it remains to be seen whether Hong Kong’s comply-
or-explain model can generate high disclosure rates on these twelve 
environmental metrics, Hong Kong has undoubtedly taken a key, innovative step 
toward developing the set of core sustainability indicators envisioned by this 
Article. 
Moving forward, however, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange should 
consider supplementing this core tier of environmental KPIs with industry-
specific and governance KPIs. As this Article has argued, although core 
sustainability indicators are essential to an effective sustainability disclosure 
 
 300.   See id. ¶¶ 4.15-4.16. 
 301.   See Analysis of Environmental, Social and Governance Practice Disclosure in 
2016/2017, HKEX 6 (May 2018), https://www.hkex.com.hk/-/media/HKEX-Market/Listing/Rules-and-
Guidance/Other-Resources/Exchanges-Review-of-Issuers-Annual-Disclosure/ESG-
Guide/esgreport_2016_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9SZ-ULVZ] [hereinafter HKEX Analysis]; see also 
Environmental, Social and Governance Reporting Guide, HKEX ¶¶ 4, 6, http://en-
rules.hkex.com.hk/net_file_store/new_rulebooks/h/k/HKEX4476_3841_VER10.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7F3D-QYDT] [hereinafter HKEX ESG Rules] (listing current sustainability reporting 
requirements). 
 302.   See HKEX Analysis, supra note 301, at 6; see also HKEX ESG Rules, supra note 
301, at A27-4 to -6 (listing all twelve environmental KPIs). 
 303.   See HKEX ESG Rules, supra note 301, at A27-4 to -6. 
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regime because they allow investors to draw broad comparisons across 
industries, mainstream investors also need industry-specific metrics that allow 
them to evaluate the most salient sustainability risks and opportunities facing 
individual companies. At the moment, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange attempts 
to account for industry-specific sustainability attributes by encouraging listed 
companies to “identify and disclose additional ESG issues and KPIs . . . that 
reflect the issuer’s significant environmental and social impacts.”304 While such 
a flexible reporting approach allows a company to disclose its unique 
sustainability profile, it also risks producing sustainability information that does 
not allow for comparisons between peer companies. To balance the need for 
standardization with the need to account for the diversity of sustainability 
challenges and opportunities that face different companies, the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange should pilot industry-specific KPIs that focus on the most important 
sustainability issues for different industries. 
Notably, it appears that the Hong Kong Stock Exchange is on its way to 
developing the third tier of governance indicators recommended by this Article. 
For a number of its Social Subject Areas, the reporting regime outlines several 
optional KPIs that relate to general corporate governance, such as (1) average 
training hours completed per employee by gender and employee category (e.g., 
senior management, middle management), (2) employee turnover rate by gender, 
age group, and geographical region, and (3) descriptions of supply chain 
management practices.305 The Hong Kong Stock Exchange should not only make 
reporting on these types of general governance KPIs mandatory, as it has done 
with the environmental KPIs, but should also expand its governance KPIs to 
cover sustainability-specific governance issues, such as board oversight of 
sustainability risks and company procedures for monitoring and responding to 
sustainability pressures. 
Of course, the design principles discussed in this Article only provide 
general guidance on the development of a sustainability disclosure regime for 
mainstream investors. The real challenge will lie in fleshing out the technical 
details of such a reporting framework, including how to define industry 
categories and which sustainability performance issues are most salient in each 
industry.306 Moreover, this Article suspects that the reporting framework will 
need to be updated over time as research on corporate sustainability performance 
and metrics continues to evolve. Nonetheless, these policy design challenges 
should not prevent regulators from moving forward on a mandatory disclosure 
framework for corporate sustainability. As discussed below in Section III.C, the 
cost-benefit analysis of such a framework weighs strongly in favor of this new 
form of information regulation. 
 
 304.   Id. ¶ 6. 
 305.   Id. at A27-7 to -13. 
 306.   Lydenberg et al., supra note 168, at 10 (identifying as “[o]ne of the chief 
challenges of sustainability reporting . . . striking a balance between comprehensiveness and relevance”). 
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C. Costs & Benefits 
This Article has argued that informational barriers have stymied investors’ 
interest in sustainability. It has suggested that a mandatory disclosure regime 
would better address these obstacles than existing voluntary disclosure 
initiatives, and it further outlined several key guiderails for developing this new 
environmental information regulation. But even assuming these arguments to be 
true, policymakers may still not want to pursue the proposed approach if the costs 
of the new regulation outweigh its benefits to society. 
This Article maintains, however, that the welfare analysis weighs decidedly 
in favor of a mandatory sustainability disclosure regime. On the benefits side of 
the ledger, the proposed information regulation directly addresses a key problem 
facing policymakers: the insufficiency of taxpayer dollars to solve today’s most 
pressing sustainability challenges.307 For example, according to a recent study 
conducted by Ceres and Bloomberg New Energy Finance, achieving the Paris 
Agreement’s goal of limiting global warming to below two degrees Celsius will 
require about $12 trillion of investments in clean energy power generation over 
the next 25 years.308 Realizing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) will 
likewise require significant financing—on the order of $5 to $7 trillion 
annually.309 Government coffers alone cannot bridge either of these finance gaps. 
 
 307.   See Douglas Beal et al., Narrowing the SDG Investment Gap: The Imperative for 
Development Finance Institutions, BOS. CONSULTING GROUP (Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://www.bcg.com/publications/2018/narrowing-sdg-investment-gap-imperative-development-
finance-institutions.aspx [https://perma.cc/TUY8-LR6E] (attributing slow progress on Sustainable 
Development Goals to a failure to effectively mobilize private investors); Marga Hoek, Why Mobilizing 
Private Capital Towards the SDG Is Good for Business, GREENBIZ (Feb. 17, 2018, 2:00 AM), 
https://www.greenbiz.com/article/why-mobilizing-private-capital-towards-sdgs-good-business 
[https://perma.cc/YA9X-UXNA] (achieving the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030 will require a 
massive mobilization of private capital); United Nations, Trends in Private Sector Climate Finance, 
RELIEFWEB 8 (Oct. 9, 2015), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/sg-trends-private-
sector-climate-finance-aw-hi-res-web1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JJ3-D3U5] (“While the public sector has a 
vital role to play, the private sector will provide the bulk of the financing and insurance driving the 
transition to a low-carbon economy.”). 
 308.   Ethan Zindler & Ken Locklin, Mapping the Gap: The Road from Paris: Finance 
Paths for a 2-Degree Future, BLOOMBERG 3 (Jan. 27, 2016), 
https://data.bloomberglp.com/bnef/sites/4/2016/01/CERES_BNEF_MTG_Overview_Deck_27January.p
df 
[https://perma.cc/C867-8Q69]; see also Deep Energy Transformation Needed by 2050 to Limit Rise in 
Global Temperature, IEA (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.iea.org/newsroom/news/2017/march/deep-
energy-transformation-needed-by-2050-to-limit-rise-in-global-temperature.html [https://perma.cc/J79R-
28RL] (estimating that the world needs to invest $3.5 trillion per year in the energy sector alone prevent 
the global temperature from rising by over two degrees Celsius). 
 309.   Chesebrough et al., supra note 155, at 6. On September 25, 2015, 193 countries 
adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which includes 17 Sustainable Development 
Goals and 169 targets relating to poverty, education, gender equality, clean water, and income 
inequality—among other sustainability issues. See United Nations, UN Adopts New Global Goals, 
Charting Sustainable Development for People and Planet by 2030, UN NEWS (Sept. 25, 2015), 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/09/509732-un-adopts-new-global-goals-charting-sustainable-
development-people-and-planet [https://perma.cc/N9SA-3WNP]. 
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Rather, as one recent United Nations report put it: “the scale of the investment 
challenge requires new flows of private capital.”310 
To the extent that a mandatory reporting regime can help align capital 
markets with sustainability objectives, it will generate large dividends for the 
environment and society. It is risky, of course, to speculate about the effects of a 
sustainability disclosure framework that has no comparable real-world analog. 
However, we suspect that implementation of the proposed regulation would yield 
a number of beneficial consequences. To begin, we believe that the disclosure 
framework would provide mainstream investors with the informational tools 
they need to confidently integrate sustainability considerations into their 
portfolios. The first tier of core sustainability indicators would allow these 
investors to bring a broad sustainability tilt to their investments by enabling 
cross-industry comparisons across broad swaths of companies. The industry-
specific and governance indicators would help investors fine-tune their 
portfolios to balance their sustainability preferences and their desired rates of 
return. The disclosure’s overarching focus on materiality would further bring 
mainstream investors into the folds of the sustainable investing movement, as 
would the adoption of a uniform set of methodologies for sustainability data, 
which would boost confidence in the accuracy of sustainability metrics as market 
signals. As a result, we expect that the proposed disclosure framework would 
expand both the number of sustainable investors and the amount of sustainable 
investments, thereby encouraging the broad movement of capital away from 
unsustainable industries and toward sustainable ones. 
At the same time, the framework’s commitment to expanding sustainability 
green lights would help redirect capital toward sustainability leaders within and 
across industries. Over time, these green-light metrics would help both investors 
and corporate executives come to understand the financial premiums that can 
arise from sustainability leadership. More companies may, in turn, decide to 
pursue ambitious sustainability action plans that are in the spirit of Unilever’s 
Sustainable Living Plan or General Electric’s Ecomagination program. More 
generally, well-designed green light metrics that focus on the profit potential of 
sustainability initiatives may engender a broader shift in the business 
community’s thinking on sustainability, helping to reframe sustainability 
pressures as core business opportunities, rather than simply as fringe risks. 
At the same time, we believe that the proposed reporting regime would 
expose companies to new competitive forces around key sustainability problems, 
and thereby sharpen companies’ focus on developing sustainability solutions. 
Through the second tier of industry-specific indicators, companies would see 
themselves ranked against their peers across an array of material sustainability 
issues. As predicted by the success of the TRI program, such comparative 
rankings would not only harness market forces to pressure companies into 
improving their sustainability performance, but they would also encourage 
 
 310.   Chesebrough et al., supra note 155, at 6. 
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corporate introspection, as companies are inspired by their peers to re-examine 
their procedures and practices in search of hidden or overlooked inefficiencies. 
We suspect that these external pressures to become more sustainable would be 
enhanced by the first tier of core sustainability indicators, which would create 
sustainability competition across industries. At the same time, internal pressures 
to become more sustainable would be enhanced by the third tier of governance 
indicators, which would force companies to examine their internal management 
and governance structures for handling sustainability challenges and 
opportunities. We therefore expect that companies would respond to the 
proposed mandatory reporting regime by increasing investments in clean 
technology R&D, developing new product lines around sustainability issues, 
collaborating with supply partners to enhance the resiliency of supply chains to 
sustainability pressures, and integrating sustainability considerations into 
business planning, investment decisions, and corporate governance. 
To be clear, this Article is not suggesting that solving the sustainability 
information problems outlined above will necessarily channel trillions of dollars 
of capital toward sustainability problems—although it would be a step in the 
right direction.311 The final impact of a mandatory sustainability disclosure 
regime will likely depend in part on factors that lie outside the control of 
policymakers, such as the true scope and frequency of win-win opportunities and 
how investors weigh long-term, sustainability-driven growth against short-term, 
unsustainable gains.312 That said, even modest movements toward sustainable 
investing could yield large benefits given the size of today’s capital markets. In 
2016, for example, the SDG finance gap could have been closed with only about 
eight percent of total assets under management globally.313 
The societal benefits of increased sustainable investing would also likely 
exceed any compliance costs associated with a mandatory reporting regime. 
True, collecting sustainability data may require some firms to invest in new 
monitoring equipment or data management systems.314 And the costs of 
 
 311.   Recall, after all, the responsiveness of stock markets to TRI disclosures. See supra 
Part II. 
 312.   See supra Sections II.A-II.B. 
 313.   In 2016, total assets under management globally summed to about $87 trillion. See 
Global Sustainable Investment Review 2016, supra note 12, at 3 (reporting in Table 1 total sustainable 
assets of $22.89 trillion and in Table 2 the proportion of sustainable investments relative to total managed 
assets to be 26.3% in 2016, such that total managed assets in 2016 equals $87 trillion ($22.89 
trillion/0.263)). As noted above, achieving the SDGs is estimated to require $5-7 trillion annually. See 
Chesebrough et al., supra note 155, at 6. Thus, this finance gap could be covered with roughly 8% of total 
assets managed ($7 trillion to achieve the SDGs/$87 trillion of total managed assets globally). 
 314.   See Bartels et al., supra note 161, at 21 (2013) (“The requirement for companies 
to disclose sustainability information is seen by some business associations as an increase in red tape, 
administrative burdens, and increased direct costs.”); Ioannou & Serafeim, supra note 221, at 5 (“Critics 
of sustainability disclosure regulations argue that companies that are ‘forced’ to increase disclosure will 
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practices that they will be forced to make, thus destroying shareholder value.”); Lydenberg et al., supra 
note 168, at 6 (“The arguments most often made against mandatory reporting, and in favor of continuing 
the current regime of voluntary reporting, are typically ones of practicality and costs—it is difficult for 
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mandatory auditing and verification of self-reported data can be substantial for 
companies, especially during the first several years.315 But a sustainability 
disclosure framework that focuses on a core set of common ESG metrics 
covering no more than ten to fifteen issues—combined with a limited number of 
material, industry-specific sustainability performance measures—should help to 
contain these costs. Indeed, recent empirical research suggests that existing 
mandatory reporting regimes requiring basic sustainability data have not 
imposed burdensome costs on firms.316 Moreover, for sustainability leaders in 
particular, any additional reporting costs may very well be offset by increases in 
stock value as mainstream investors—guided by a clearer and more robust set of 
sustainability metrics—begin adding a sustainability tilt to their portfolios.317 As 
a result, a well-designed mandatory disclosure program might actually increase 
shareholder value, net the additional reporting expenses, by allowing leading 
firms to finally cash in on sustainability premiums.318 
Furthermore, a mandatory reporting regime likely imposes fewer costs than 
other forms of environmental regulation. As noted above, environmental 
information regulation is known for its relatively light regulatory touch and high 
value.319 The sustainability disclosure regime proposed by this Article is no 
different. Unlike command-and-control regulations, for example, mandatory 
sustainability reporting does not attempt to force capital markets to align with 
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221 and accompanying text. 
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 317.   Professors Jody Grewal, Edward J. Riedl, and George Serafeim, for example, 
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mandated increased disclosure of ESG information by various companies. Grewal et al., supra note 122, 
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Serafeim, supra note 221, at 3-4. 
 319.   See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
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sustainability objectives. Rather, it seeks merely to unlock investor interest in 
sustainability that already exists. Arguably then, it goes after the lowest hanging 
opportunities to further the sustainability agenda. Moreover, it builds on existing 
intellectual and regulatory infrastructure, including decades of experimentation 
and development of sustainability metrics and an even longer history of 
mandatory financial disclosures.320 As a result, the costs of designing the 
proposed regulation should be relatively small. Taken together, there are strong 
reasons to believe that the benefits of a mandatory sustainability disclosure 
regime would substantially outweigh its costs. 
We note that this calculus does not depend on the validity of the well-
known, but contentious, efficient capital market hypothesis.321 According to this 
theory of finance, investors cannot systematically beat the market (i.e., receive 
above-market returns) through strategic stock picking (e.g., selecting sustainable 
companies over unsustainable ones).322 This conclusion follows from the 
premise that information spreads very quickly through capital markets.323 Thus, 
when new information about a company or industry is released into the public 
domain, stock prices adjust almost instantaneously as hordes of investors quickly 
sell or buy shares that have become over- or undervalued as a result of the new 
information.324 In turn, the prices of the over- or undervalued firms will fall or 
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rise until the risk-adjusted returns are identical across all publicly traded 
companies of the same systemic-risk class.325 While those investors who acted 
first on the information release may realize above-market returns, adherents to 
the efficient market hypothesis argue that few investors will consistently have 
this information edge over their peers, given the vast number of investors and 
analysts dedicated to continuously combing markets for relevant financial 
data.326 Therefore, they contend that stock picking cannot outperform market 
indices in the long run.327 
Whether capital markets are, in fact, efficient remains a hotly debated issue 
among finance scholars. Advancements in behavioral finance research have 
contested many of the theory’s central tenants.328 Other work suggests that stock 
prices are particularly slow to incorporate information on intangible assets, 
including many sustainability initiatives.329 In addition, today’s capital markets 
are notorious for their focus on short-term profit maximization.330 They may 
therefore misprice the long-term value creation resulting from sustainability 
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leadership.331 Indeed, a growing number of empirical studies suggest that 
sustainability-conscious portfolios can outperform the market in the long run.332 
However, even if the efficient market hypothesis holds true, it would not 
undermine the desirability or policy logic of a mandatory sustainability 
disclosure regime. This Article has argued that well-designed sustainability 
reporting requirements will generate new financially material information on 
sustainability leaders and laggards.333 On the basis of this new information, an 
efficient capital market should respond by shifting investments away from 
overvalued firms (sustainability laggards) and toward undervalued firms 
(sustainability leaders). Thus, even if individual investors cannot systematically 
beat the market on the basis of sustainability factors, mandatory disclosure of 
material sustainability information will nonetheless increase overall sustainable 
investment levels—thereby realizing the public policy objectives of the proposed 
information regulation.334 
IV. Conclusion 
American environmental law needs fresh thinking on regulatory design to 
solve the sustainability challenges of the twenty-first century. While the 
traditional command-and-control model of environmental regulation made great 
strides in cleaning up and protecting the nation’s environment and public health, 
this regulatory strategy has become outdated in the face of today’s increasingly 
complex sustainability problems—including, most notably, climate change.335 
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As a number of scholars have noted, much of the low-hanging fruit has already 
been harvested under the current command-and-control regime, and it will be 
costly to continue to use this model to address new sustainability challenges.336 
As Professor Esty recently argued, it makes sense to go “beyond ‘red lights’ that 
tell polluters what they cannot do, and create[] an expanded structure of green 
lights—incentives to spur fresh thinking and creative responses to persistent 
pollution challenges.”337 
The present Article answers this call by recasting environmental 
information regulation to harness mainstream investors’ growing interest in 
sustainability. Like American environmental regulation writ large, the standard 
model of environmental information regulation has worked to create a series of 
red lights that warn investors away from environmental laggards and penalize 
poor environmental performance. But it has done much less to identify and 
reward sustainability leaders who deliver innovative solutions to critical 
sustainability problems. As this Article argues in Part II, the red-lights model 
may have worked well when investors’ interest in sustainability remained limited 
to a few socially responsible investors. But it has become increasingly obsolete 
in the face of growing interest in sustainability among mainstream investors. 
Now, as with American environmental law more generally, regulators must 
commit to developing an expanded set of green lights if they hope to fully 
harness the potential of sustainable investing. 
Toward this end, Part III outlines several core features of a revamped 
sustainability information regulation for mainstream investors. It argues, in 
particular, for a framework that is based on the principles of financial materiality 
and that is capable of identifying sustainability leaders and laggards. Developing 
the optimal menu of industry-specific sustainability metrics will certainly be a 
challenge. But there are good reasons to believe that efforts to develop a robust 
mandatory sustainability disclosure framework will succeed. For one, such a 
regulation has strong support from large segments of the investor community. 
For another, much of the intellectual and regulatory groundworks for a 
mandatory sustainability reporting program have already been laid through 
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decades of financial disclosure standards and years of experimentation with 
sustainability metrics. Regulators should not let this policy window pass, as few 
sustainability regulations promise so many benefits for so little cost. Rather, they 
should act now and harness this momentum toward sustainability by updating 
environmental information regulation to the needs of the twenty-first-century 
investor. 
